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ABSTRACT

In this pape r we pres ent an eval uati on of
inte rnat iona lly
agre ed limi ts on publ ic sect or debt and defi
cits
such as thos e
agre ed by the EC coun tries in the Trea
ty
of
Maa
stric ht as
prec ondi tion s for mem bersh ip i~ a mon etary
unio
n.
Thes
e ·fisc al
conv erge nce crit eria requ ire that gene ral
gove
rnme
nt
budg et
defi cits shou ld not exce ed 3% of GDP and that
the
gros
s
debt
of the
gene ral gove rnme nt shou ld not be abov e 60% of
GDP.
The
Maa
stric
ht
requ irem ents ,
espe cial ly the debt crit erio n, are much
more
strin gen t than thos e requ ired to ensu re pub
The ir impl eme ntati on woul d requ ire an exce lic sect or solv ency .
ssiv
retre nchm ent that woul d have nega tive cons eque e degr ee of fisc al
nces on the leve l of
econ omic acti vity .
The defi cit guid elin e does not appe ar to be
sens ible , sinc e . the num erica l crit erio n
refe rs to the nom inal
inte rest paym ents -inc lusiv e fina ncia l defi cit,
with no corr ecti ons
for infl atio n and real outp ut grow th, no cycl
ical
adju stme nt and no
appr opri ate allow ance for futu re reve nue prod
ucin
g publ ic sect or
inve stme nt. The verb al qua lific atio ns are too
vagu
e to neu trali ze
the pote ntia l for serio us dama ge attac hed
to
the
guid elin es.
We disc uss the vari ous "ext erna lity" argunum erica l
men ts in
favo r of bind ing fisc al rule s and find
them
wan
ting
both
theo retic ally and emp irica lly.
An argu men t in favo r of exte rnal
enfo rcem ent of bind ing fisc al rule s migh t be
of "exc essiv e defi cits " due to poli tica l dist made in the pres ence
that the fisc al conv erge nce crit eria shou orti ons . We conc lude
appl ied quit e loos ely in orde r to avoi d the ld be disr egar ded or
risk of seri ous fisc al
ove rkil l.
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INTRODUCTION.

The agreement reached by the governments of the twelv
e EC members at the
Maastricht summit in December 1991, to move ahead towar
ds full monetary union by
the end of the decade at the latest, can with hindsight be
seen as the crest of a wave
of West-European integration that had begun to build in
the mid-eighties. Since early
1992, a sequence of adverse developments of increasing
severity has undermined the
progress towards European Monetary Union. The "no" vote
in the Danish ratification
referendum starte d the unraveling of Maastricht. The deval
uation within the ERM of
the Lira by 7 percent, agreed on Sunday September 13,
1992 came next. The token
0.25% cut that same day in the German Lombard rate (and
the 0.5% reduction in the
German Discount Rate), reinforced by several Bundesbank
official indiscretions, made it
clear that the Bundesbank shared the opinion of a growing
number of private financial
market participants that further realignments were neces
sary. On September 17, the
suspension of the ERM membership of the UK and Italy,
followed by the floating of
these two currencies, and a devaluation of the Peseta
by 5% created a European
financial panic. The convincing "yes" vote in the Irish ratific
ation referendum and the
the narrow "yes" vote in the French ratification referendum
on Sunday September 20
were not sufficient to ensure the ultim ate survival of the
Treat y. The decision by the
British government to postpone a Parliamentary vote on
the Treat y until after the
second Danish referendum further lengthened the odds again
st the Treat y.
It is therefore possible that the subject matte r of our paper
, the fiscal convergence
criteria of the Maastricht Treat y, may, like the whole
of the Treat y, become moot
from a short -term political point of view.

Fortunately for us, the Maastricht

convergence criteria raise issues that are important regard
less of the success of the
current attem pt at achieving monetary union in Europe.
The process of European
economic integration will continue regardless of the fate
of the Maastricht Treaty.
Even if the Treat y does not survive the recent political
challenges, attem pts to revive
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the EMS are still likely in the near future and renewed attem
pts at achieving monetary
union can be expected.
It is, however, likely (and in our view desirable), that
monetary unification, if and when it happens, will follow
rather than anticipate and
precede greater political integration. The concerns with
government debt and deficits
expressed in the Treat y of Maastricht can thus be expec
ted to resurface as monetary
union

comes

back

on

the

agenda.

We

therefore

present

our

evaluation

of
internationally agreed limits on public sector debt and
deficits as preconditions . for
membership in a monetary union, without paying any
further Danegeld to recent
political developments.
Fearing that a monetary union without sufficient economic
convergence might be
fragile and a source of ·economic and social tensions, the
EC governments agreed that
satisfying four economic convergence criteria would be
a necessary condition for
admission to the monetary union. Three of these conditions
make some intuitive sense
considering the goal of a stable monetary union.
First, inflation rates among the member countries should
converge to a level not
too far above the inflation rates of the three members with
the lowest inflation rates.
A monetary union requires convergence to a common rate
of inflation of trada ble goods.
While in principle this common inflation rate need not be
a low or even a stable one,
this concession to anti-inflationary rectitude is neithe
r surprising nor necessarily
harmful.

Note, however, that it rules out the option of using the aband
onment of the
national currency as an anti-inflationary· device for a count
ry that cannot deliver low
inflation as long as it has any national monetary autonomy.
Second, there should be stability of the nominal exchange
rates for some time
before monetary union and lack of persistent pressures for
realignment. This too is not
a logical prerequisite for a credible monetary union. One
cannot dismiss the possibility
(or even the desirability) of a final grand realignment the
instant before exchange rates
are irrevocably frozen and national currencies disappear,
especially if the authorities
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have managed to convince the public that such an end-game
realignment would not
occur. It may, however, not be optimal to start the new comm
on currency era with a
major act of fooling the people.
Third, nominal interest rate should converge (to a level not
more than two
percentage points above that achieved by the three lowest inflati
on countries). With
the very high degree of intra- EC :financial capital mobility achiev
ed through the single
market and given credibly fixed exchange rates (criterion two),
the only source of
interest differentials would be differential default risk. Convergence
of inflation rates
·(criterion 1) does not in and of itself eliminate sovereign defaul
t risk. Achieving the
elimination of the sovereign risk premium. may be one motivation
for the fourth and
last convergence criterion.
The fourth convergence criterion refers to fiscal policies: public
deficits should be
kept or reduced below 3% of GDP and public debt should be
kept or lowered below
60% of GDP. In the view of the backers and authors of the
Treaty, lack of formal
fiscal constraints would lead to "excessive deficits" and thus to
monetary and financial
instability.
In this paper we assess the case for fiscal rules such as those
agreed to at
Maastricht. 1 Two sets of basic issues are raised. First, what
is the logic behind the
Treaty 's concern with public debt and deficits ?
Specifically, why should the
Community worry about the consequences of "excessive" deficits,
i.e.· what is the nature
of the externalities that excessive deficits in one country might
impose on other EC
countries, and what is the evidence about their importance?
Second, how are these
theoretical criteria to be implemented in practice?
The plan of the paper is the following.

In Section I we present the fiscal criteria

of Maastricht in greater detail and discuss their relation to
the other convergence
criteria. We will evaluate the official rationale behind the EC
concern with deficits
and debt and interp ret the logic behind the particular numerical
reference values chosen
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at Maastricht.
In Section II we analyze the present fiscal conditions
in the EC countries as
as the historical trends in public sector deficits and
debt, and compare them with
Maastricht targets. We will discuss whether the curre
nt path of fiscal policy in
EC member states is sustainable and present simu
lations measuring the size of

well
the
the

the
adjustment effort required to satisfy the fiscal convergen
ce criteria by the deadline for
monetary union. An impo rtant (and quite hotly
contested) issue here concerns .the
consequences for the level of economic activity in
Europe of a generalized fiscal
retrenchment by the EC aimed at reducing public secto
r deficits and debt towards the
Maastricht targets.

Is there a risk of a deflationary and reces siona rt bias
?
In Section III of the paper we consider in detail what
appears the logic behind
the Trea ty's concern with public debt and deficits. We
evaluate the various arguments
for and against the fiscal rules. We also ask why
any country would systematically
follow policies of "excessive" deficits;

i.e. what are the economic or political distortions

that would lead to a persistent bias towards large
r-tha n-op tima l budget deficits, and
what is the empirical evidence about their prevalence
? In the presence of political and
other distortions that lead to excessive deficits by mem
ber states, is there a role for an
external agent (such as the EC) to impose rules
for fiscal discipline, monitor their
impiementation and credibly enforce them with a
set of sanctions against deviant
countries? Some concluding remarks are offered in Secti
on IV.
I. THE FISCAL CONVERGENCE CRITERIA OF MAA
STRICHT.

In 1989, the Delors Report argued that a European
monetary union without fiscal
convergence might lead to monetary and economic
instability in the Community2 and
recommended the imposition of binding fiscal rules to
limit policy makers' discretion in
deciding the size and financing of fiscal deficits.
Following the publication of the
Delors Report the debate on "excessive" fiscal defic
its, on the need for binding fiscal
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rules in the EC and on the coordination of fiscal policies has been wide-r
anging. 3
The new Treaty approved at the Maastricht summit in December 1991
followed
the spirit of the Delors recommendations by introducing a set of princip
les of fiscal
discipline to be followed by member countries.

The first principle is, in the words of

Article 104c, that "Member States shall avoid excessive deficits". The
definition of
"excessive" deficits relies on two fiscal reference values for government deficits
and debt
that are spelled out in the Protocol on the excessive deficits procedure
annexed to :the
Treaty.

The Treaty also establishes sanctions against countries found to be having
excessive deficits.
The second principle, expressed in Article 104b of the Treaty, is the "no-ba
il-out
clause" according to which each member country (and only that membe
r country) is
responsible for servicing its public debt.
This article implies that no Community
member or agency will bail-out other member countries that experience a
fiscal crisis.
The third principle, expressed in Articles 104 and 104a, "bans direct central
bank
financing and access to favorable financing of public deficits, by prohibiting
the granting
of central bank credit to governments, the obligatory purchase by banks
of public debt
instruments and privileged access by governments to financial institutions"
(Commission
of the European Communities, Annual Report for 1991). 4
The assessment of "excessive" deficits starts from two reference criteria for
deficits
and public debt.
First, the general government deficit (net borrowing) should not
exceed 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market prices; second
, the general
government gross debt should not exceed 60% of GDP at market prices.
These reference values are important because a country formally found
to have
"excessive" deficits would fail one of the four criteria (the fiscal convergence
criterion)
for joining the monetary union and would therefore be excluded from it.
Unlike the reference values for the inflation, interest rate and exchan
ge rate
convergence criteria, however, the fiscal reference values are not rigid
and several
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circumstances will be taken into account in deciding whether deficit
s are "excessive".
First of all, a deficit in excess of 3% might be allowed if it "is
only exceptional and
temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value".
Second, other factors specific to a country such as "whether
the government
deficit exceeds government investment expenditures" will be taken
into consideration.
This implies, for example, that a country with a high level of public
investment (such
as Spain or Portugal) might be allowed to run deficits in excess
of 3% if it is deemed
that such a high level of capital expenditures is appropriate.
Third, a deficit might not be considered excessive if it "has. declin
ed substantially
and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the referen
ce value" (Article
104c (a)). The significance· of this caveat is due to the possib
ility that, if the 3%
criterion were applied rigidly as a convergence criterion for joinin
g the monetary union,
a number of countries (for example Italy) would be excluded from
joining the monetary
union even if they had significantly improved their fiscal perfor
mance. The caveat
suggests that a country such as Italy might be allowed to join
the monetary union at
the end of 1996 or 1998 if its 1991 deficit of 10.2% of GDP
had by then been
significantly and continuously reduced to a value close to but
still in excess of 3%.
How close to 3% is, however, left vague in the Treaty.
Fourth, a debt to GDP ratio in excess of 60% would not be deeme
d excessive if
it is "sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value
at a satisfactory rate"
(Article 104c (b)). The reason for this caveat is quite clear.
A number of EC
countries have debt to GDP ratios well above 60%, in the case of
Belgium, Ireland and
Italy above 100% of GDP with Greece just under 100% · of GDP.
Economic wisdom
(reinforced with simple numerical benchmark calculations reported
in Section II of this
paper and complete econometric model simulations reported in
Section III), suggests
that even with a major fiscal retrenchment in these countries
it would be close to
impossible to. achieve a reduction of the debt-t o-GD P ratio to 60%
of GDP in time for
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the beginning of 1997 (or of 1999) deadline.
One implication of these caveats is that the two reference values for deficits
and
debt will not be applied strictly and that countries whose deficits and/or
debts exceed
the reference values may not be found to have "excessive" deficits as long
as they have
made steady and substantial efforts towards achieving them.

Another implication is

that the wording of the Treaty is sufficiently vague that potentially irrelev
ant or even
'
harmful political considerations are likely to be used in the assessment
of whether the
fiscal convergence criteria have been met or not.
The formal procedure that leads to a decision on whether a countr
y has
"excessive" deficits or not is complex and laid out in detail in Article 104c.
First, the
Commission writes a report on a country that does not satisfy the deficit
or the debt
reference values. The report (addressed to the Council) expresses the
opinion of the
Commission on whether an "excessive" deficit exists. Such an assessment
will take into
account all the factors and caveats discussed above.
The Council, acting on a qualified majority, will decide whether the countr
y has
an excessive deficit.
Before the currency union, a finding that the country has an
"excessive" deficit would imply that the country has not fulfilled the fiscal
criterion for
convergence and would not be allowed to join the union. After the moneta
ry union, a
finding of uexcessive deficits" might lead to the imposition of a numbe
r of economic
sanctions against the deviant country. 5
It should also be observed that the fiscal convergence criteria for joining
EMU are
linked (economically if not legally) to the other three convergence criteria
, the inflation
rate, the interest rate and the exchange rate convergence criteria. 6 The
price stability
criterion (together with the principle of no central bank financing of budget
deficits at
the discretion of the national governments) prevents the use of nationally
differentiated
seigniorage as a way of financing the fiscal deficit and reducing the debt
ratios towards
their target levels.
The interest rate criterion is not redund ant, even with the

8

increasing degree of international capital mobility among EMS members and in the
presence of the inflation criterion.

With efficient financial markets and ignoring

differences due to taxation, international nominal interest rate differentials on public
sector debt instruments are the sum of three components: the expected proportional
rate of depreciation of the nominal spot exchange rate, the exchange rate risk premium
(or currency risk premium) and a national default risk premium reflecting the
possibility of debt repudiation due, for instance, to unsustainable fiscal positions.

The

criterion therefore implies that it is not enough, for a high debt and deficit country, to
follow a strict anti-inflation policy that brings its current inflation rate down to the
level of the best performing states.

A serious fiscal adjustment is also required for a

number of reasons.
First, such an adjustment could reduce and eventually eliminate national default
risk premia by insuring the feasibility of a binding commitment to meet the
government solvency constraint.

Second, the fiscal policy adjustment would also affect

differentials in interest rates due to expected exchange rate depreciation and the
currency risk premium; these two components of the international interest differential
would disappear completely only if market participants were totally certain that the
country would join the monetary union and stay with it irrevocably.

Since what

represents sufficient fiscal adjustment is left vague in the Treaty, markets will attach
positive probability to the prospect that a country will be excluded on the basis of
fiscal criteria; and this probability will be higher for countries with worse fiscal
conditions.

This, in turn,

will tend to keep nominal interest rates higher than they

would be otherwise, since being unable to join EMU might undermine the fiscal and
inflation credibility of the country and thus create a future exchange rate depreciation
risk.
What can be inferred about the underlying motivation for Maastricht's concern
about "excessive deficits"?

One interpretation is that "excessive deficits" is really a
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code word for "excessive government size" or "excessive public spending".

In this view,

the protagonists of binding commitments to reduce excessive deficits hope
and/or expect
(like the intellectual fathers of Reagonomics) that spending cuts rather
than tax
increases will be used to achieve such reductions. However, if we take
the Treaty and
its intellectual antecedents at face value, it appears that behind its
rules against
"excessive" deficits lies the concern that, in the absence of such binding
fiscal rules, at
least some EC governments might be subject to a systematic bias toward
s excessive
budget deficits and that this bias might have serious negative external
effects on other
EC countries.
the following
1.

The key externalities that have been stressed by proponents of EMU are
7:

Excessive deficits

by a member

country

might

eventually lead

to

an

unsustainable public debt position and to a fiscal solvency crisis includi
ng debt default
that will force the other member countries into a fiscal "bail-o ut" of
the insolvent
government.
2. A fiscal and financial crisis in one EC country could, through fundam
ental
financial interdependence or through contagion effects, spread to other
countries and
force the future European Central Bank (ECB) to inject excessive liquidi
ty into the EC
financial system, thus creating additional inflationary pressure throug
hout the EMU
area.
3. Even when government solvency is not an issue, there are international
interest
rate and exchange rate spill overs from national deficit financing
policies.
Such
external effects must be internalized by cooperative action. In the
budgetary field,
centrally imposed and enforced rules are the best way of achieving cooper
ative behavior.
Another issue raised by the Maastricht Treaty concerns the logic behind
the
particular numerical reference values of 3% of GDP for the deficit and 60%
of GDP for
the public debt.
At first glance, the particular levels that were chosen appear
arbitrary;

the debt reference value is very close to the average value of this indicat
or
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for the EC in 1991 (61.7%) while the actual average deficit-GDP ratio in 1991 (4.3%)
was above the reference value. There is of course no reason to believe the current
average values to be optimal for the EC as a whole (on average), let alone for each
of
the 12 individual member states, which differ greatly in economic structure (levels
and
real growth rates of per capita GDP, inflation rates, degree of financial develop
ment,
tax structur e and tax administration capacity, size of the state enterprise sector
etc.)
and as regards initial conditions.
Simple debt dynamics accounting shows that the debt to GDP ratio evolves
according to the following formula:
(I.1)

dt - dt-1

=-

7Pt

[1 + 'I/Jt]dt + deft

where deft is the· deficit to GDP ratio, dt is the debt to GDP ratio, and ¢t is the
rate
of growth of nominal GDP, the sum of the growth rate of real GDP and the rate
of
(GDP) inflation. When the debt to GDP ratio is constant we get:
(I.2)

dt

= [(1+¢t)f ¢t]

deft

Equation (I.2) suggests that in the long run the deficit and debt guideline can
only be consistent with each other given particular assumptions about the long
run
growth rate of nominal GDP. EC documents forecast an average long run growth
rate
of re~l GDP of 3% per year for the EC countries. 8
monetary union is price stability.

One of the main objectives of the

In the particular European context, this probably

translates into a target inflation rate for the GDP deflator around 2% per
year.
Complete price stability for internationally traded goods is likely to imply a positive
(around 1 or 2 percent per annum) rate of inflation for broad price indices like
the
GDP deflator and the CPI, which include non-tra ded goods whose prices tend to
rise
faster than those of traded goods. Note that not even Germany in its prime achieve
d
a sustained zero inflation rate. 9

A real growth target of 3% and an inflation target of

2% then sum to a long term growth rate of nominal GDP of 5% per year.

Thus,
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equation (I.2) shows that for the EC as a whole, a steady state deficit of 3% of GDP
per year and a 5% growth rate of nominal GDP require a stable long run debt to
GDP ratio of approximately 60% (with continuous compounding it would be exactly
60%).

There may appear to be some deeper economic logic behind the choice of the 3%
numerical reference value for the deficit-GDP ratio.

A number of EC documents refer

to the "golden rule of public finance" 10 according to which only capital expenditures
can be financed with borrowing while current expenditures should be covered with
current revenues.

This principle requires that the gross savings of the government

should always be larger than or equal to zero (with perhaps an exception for cyclical
fluctuations).

As it happens, capital expenditures in the EC have averaged 3% of GDP

for a long period of time.11

In this sense the 3% net borrowing guideline could be.

interpreted as implementing the idea that borrowing should be used only for investment
purposes (under the maintained assumption that public investment will remain at 3% of
GDP).
On reflection, however, the derivation of the reference value for the deficit from
the "golden rule of public finance" appears to be false, except in a world with a zero
rate of inflation.

That "golden rule of public finance" does not state that the

"nominal" net lending of the government should not exceed its capital spending; it says
instead that the real "gross savings" of the government must be non-negative where
the gross savings are equal to the inflation-adjusted net lending of the government
minus gross government capital spending.

With a 3% deficit to GDP ratio and public

investmen t to GDP ratio, if the target inflation rate is 2% per year and the steady
state debt to GDP ratio is equal to 60%, real government savings would actually be
positive and approximately equal to 1.2% of GDP, the reduction in the real value of a
60% debt ratio induced by 2% inflation.

Thus, in the steady state implied by the

Maastricht rules only part of public investment (up to 1.8% of GDP) would be

i

I
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financed by borrowing.12 13

It follows that, other things being equal, the "golden rule"

would still be satisfied if we considered steady states characte rized by higher
ratios of
debt and deficit relative to GDP.

II. FISCAL CONDITIONS AND PROSP ECTS OF THE EC COUNTRIES.

Il.l THE CONDITIONS IN 1992.
How do the Maastri cht fiscal guidelines stack up against the current general
government debt- and deficit ratios of the Commu nity members?

If we compar e the

fiscal guidelines chosen at Maastri cht with the fiscal conditions of the EC in
1991/92,
we observe that very few countries satisfied these guidelines in 1991 and even
fewer are
expected to satisfy them in 1992. As shown in Table II.1, only German y, France,
the
UK, Denmar k, Ireland and Luxembourg kept their general government net borrowi
ng
below 3% of GDP in 1991 and only France, Denmar k, Ireland and Luxemb
ourg are
expected to do so in 1992.

Regarding the debt ratio requirem ent, Table II.2 shows

that the only EC countries with a gross general government debt to GDP ratio
below
60% in 1991 were German y, France, the UK, Spain and Luxembourg (Portug
al, at
64. 7% and Denmar k at 66. 7% just fail to qualify).

In 1992 the same five countries are

again the only ones expected (according to the EC's generally somewh at
optimis tic
forecasts) to meet the debt ratio criterion.
While only German y, France, the UK and Luxembourg satisfy both criteria
in

1991 and only France and Luxembourg are expecte d to satisfy both criteria
in 1992,
there is a wide divergence in the fundam ental fiscal conditions of the other
countries.
At one extreme , the worst fiscal problems are faced by Italy and Greece.

These two

countries are charact erized by very large budget deficits (10.2% of GDP in
Italy and
16.5% of GDP in Greece during 1991). Table II.3 shows primary balances
that are
either barely in surplus (a virtual primary balance in 1991 for Italy, with a
0.7% of

13
GDP primary surplus expected, very optimistically, for 1992) or still in deficit (3.3%
in
1991 and, very optimistically, an expected 0.5% in 1992 for Greece). Debt to
GDP
ratios remain very high (101.2% for Italy and and 96.4% for Greece in 1991).
The underlying conditions of the other two high government debt countries,
Belgium and Ireland are quite different. While these two countries are characte
rized
by very high debt to GDP ratios (129.4% for Belgium and and 102.8% for Ireland
in
1991) that are the consequence of huge deficits in the 1970s and early 1980s, they
now
show substantial primary surpluses (4. 7% for Belgium and 6% for Ireland in 1991)
and
overall deficits that are reasonably low. In Ireland, the debt to GDP ratio has
been
steadily falling since 1987.

In Belgium, the debt to GDP ratio has been approximately

stable at its 1987 level.
An intermediate country is the Netherlands where the debt ratio, although quite
high (78.4% of GDP in 1991), has stabilized since 1990 thanks to growing primary
surpluses

(equal to 2.0% of GDP in 1991).

Moreover, the overall deficit in 1991

(3.9% of GDP) is quite close to the Maastricht guideline.
from each other in a number of ways.

Spain and Portugal differ

The overall fiscal deficit is quite small for

Spain (at 4.4% of GDP) and moderate in the case of Portugal (at 6.4% of GDP).
In
the case of Spain the debt ratio is below 60% (45.6% in 1991) while Portugal is
above
the guideline (64.7% in 1991). Spain, however, still has a small primary deficit (0.2%
of GDP in 1991) while Portugal has a 2.1% of GDP primary surplus in 1991.
Germany and the United Kingdom both have comparable debt ratios well below
60%.

The West-G erman overall deficit was 3.1% of GDP in 1991 while Britain scored
2% that year.
Both countries are, however, expected to violate the deficit ratio
criterion in 1992.

In spite of the fact that the U.K. deficit is expected to be well

above the German one in 1992 (4.9% as opposed to 3.4%), the structural
fiscal
conditions of the U.K. may be more robust than the German ones. In fact, the
U.K.
deficits in the 1991-1992 period appear to have a major cyclical component, reflectin
g
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the recession that resulted when Britain joined the exchange rate arrangements of the
EMS at a greatly overvalued parity.

This transitory cyclical component of the deficit

should disappear (except for the interest on the additional debt accumulated during the
recession) as and when the UK gets out of the present recession.

The recent British

suspension of its ERM membership and the associated depreciation of Sterling and cuts
in interest rates make a recovery more likely.

The component of the German deficit

that reflects the unification process, while not cyclical, should nevertheless not expected
to be permanent.

There is, however, considerable uncertainty and disagreement about

the magnitude and degree of persistence of future the net budgetary transfers to
households, firms and other agencies in the former DDR.

Their likely duration surely

exceeds that of the typical business cycle.
Denmark is borderline on the debt criterion (66.7% of GDP in 1992), but solid
primary surpluses and low overall deficits (2% of GDP in 1991) put her among the
more fiscally sound economies.

Finally, France and Luxembourg are the only two

countries to satisfy both fiscal criteria, with fiscal deficits equal to 1. 7% of GDP in
France and -2.5% of GDP in Luxembourg and debt ratios equal in 1991 to 47.2% and
6.9% respectively.

II.2 THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH DEFICITS AND DEBT.

While very few countries will fulfill the fiscal guidelines in 1992, the historical
experience of the past few decades, shown in Tables II.l, Il.2 and Il.3, also suggests
that fiscal deficits and debt ratios above the Maastricht reference values have occurred
regularly in the past.

Even disregarding the high deficits and debt to GDP ratios of

many European countries in the period right after World War II, debt ratios above
60% and deficits above 3% have been quite common in the last 30 years.
In the 1960s, the gross debt to GDP ratio was above 60% in the United
Kingdom and Belgium.

The rate for the U.K. had been close to 130% in 1960 (a
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leftover from the WWII debt build-up) and by 1970 was still equal to 80%.
Belgian ratio was over 80% in 1960 and had fallen to 68% by 1970.

The

In all the other

EC countries (but Italy) the debt to GDP ratio was falling in the 1960-1973 period
while the average overall deficit to GDP ratio was on average below 3% per year in all
countries but Ireland (see Tables II.l and II.2).
The post-1973 stagflationary period was characterized by the rapid rise in the
ratio of general government expenditures in GDP and the emergence of very large and
persistent budget deficits and rising debt to GDP ratios in most European countries.
In particular, the debt to GDP ratio was above 60% some time during the decade in
Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the U.K.

Moreover, during the 1971-1980 decade, the

general government budget deficit was on average at or above 3% of GDP in Belgium
(5.1%), Ireland (8.4%), Italy (7.6) and the United Kingdom (3.0%).

Also, deficits in

excess of 3% of GDP were observed in West-Germany (in 1975-76), Denmark (in
1980), the Netherlands (in 1979-80).14
While some fiscal retrenchment occurred in the 1976-1979 period after the deficits
and the debt build-up following the first oil shock, large and persistent fiscal deficits
were experienced again in the 1979-1983 period following the second oil shock which, in
the cases of Italy, Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands, led to a
significant increase in the debt to GDP ratio.

Overall, during the 1980s, deficit to

GDP ratios averaged above 3% of GDP in Belgium (8.8%), Greece (12.9%), Spain
(4.6%),

Ireland

(9.3%),

Italy

(11.2%), the Netherlands

(5.8%),

Portugal (7.9%).

Moreover, all the remaining EC countries but Luxembourg (that is, Denmark, Germany,
France and the United Kingdom) experienced deficits in excess of 3% of GDP at some
point during the 1980s.

As a consequence of these fiscal imbalances, the debt to GDP

ratio peaked at 122% in Ireland in 1987, at 132% in Belgium in 1988, at 80% in
Denmark in 1984 and at 75% in Portugal in 1988, while it had not yet stabilized in
1991 in Italy and Greece.

The debt-GDP ratio in the Netherlands may just have
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peaked in 1991/92.
Since the mid 1980s, the fiscal balances of a number of these countries have
improved; dramatic fiscal retrenchment and large primary surpluses in Denmark,
Belgium and Ireland have led to a reduction in the debt to GDP ratio in these
countries; since 1988 a significant fiscal adjustment has occurred in Portugal as well,
and a smaller adjustment has taken place since 1991 in the Netherlands.

In Italy and

Greece, however, the fiscal adjustment in the last few years has not been sufficient to
prevent further increases of the debt-GDP ratio.

Il.3 SOLVENCY, SUSTAINABILITY AND PRIMARY GAPS.

The Treaty clause about the need to avoid "excessive" deficits stems in part from
a concern that a number of member countries are following fiscal policies that are not
sustainable in the long run.

An important policy question is therefore whether the

empirical evidence tndicates that the government's intertemporal budget constraint or
solvency constraint is actually likely to be met in each EC country if past and current
patterns of behavior persist.
Empirically, the answer to this question is difficult because the solvency constraint
per se generally imposes only mild restrictions on the behavior of the public sector.

In principle, almost any finite duration path of revenue and expenditure can satisfy it:
large and persistent deficits today can always be offset with large surpluses at some
time in the future.

However, while the solvency constraint does not rule out policies

generating large primary general government deficits for prolonged periods of time, it
does rule out the possibility that these policies be maintained forever when the initial
stock of debt is positive.
A first approach to the empirical testing of the solvency condition is the one
followed by Hamilton and Flavin [1986) and Wilcox [1989)

(see also Trehan and Walsh

(1989), Buiter and Patel [1990), Corsetti (1991), Corsetti and Roubini [1991, 1992a) and
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Wickens [1992]).

This class of tests stems from the following idea.

The intertemporal

budget constraint of the public sector is satisfied if, in the limit, the value of future
government debt discounted to some fixed initial date goes to zero.

The validity of

the present-value budget constraint can therefore be verified by estimating the data
generating process for the discounted debt and checking whether the long run value of
the discounted debt vanishes in expectation.
Using such solvency tests for a large set of OECD countries over the sample
1971-1989, Corsetti and Roubini [1991, 1992a] find that problems of sustainability of
the present paths of fiscal policy appear to exist in Italy, Belgium, Ireland, the
Netherlands and Greece.

Note that these countries have in common a large current

debt to GDP ratio (close to or above 100% in Italy, Belgium and Ireland).
This class of solvency tests is carried out under the maintained hypothesis that
the data generating process describing the evolution of discounted debt and/or deficit is
stable (in the sense of parameter constancy) over time.

The weakness of this approach,

therefore, is that it may fail to capture structural breaks in these processes deriving,
for example, from the structural changes in fiscal policy that have occurred in countries
such as Ireland or Belgium in the mid 1980s and in the Netherlands since the
beginning of the nineties.
The solvency conditions for the government are (extremely) forward-looking.

Any

assessment of solvency therefore depends on assumptions about the evolution of future
primary balances into the indefinite future.

Apart from the solvency tests described

above, there are several alternative approaches in the literature to deal with this
problem, all of which can be encompassed in a simple framework that looks at the
"primary gaps" of the fiscal authorities.

The idea of the "primary gaps" (see

Blanchard [1990] and Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor [1990]) is to consider
the difference between the constant primary balance (as a share of GDP) that would
stabilize the debt to GDP ratio over some time horizon and the actual primary
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balance.

This concept is interesting in the Maastricht context because it sugges
t the
minimum necessary amount of fiscal adjustment required to stabilize and
start reducing
the debt to GDP ratio. One can define alternative measures of the primar
y gap.

* as the
First, define sN
N-period required primary surplus, i.e. the constant
primary surplu s-GDP ratio that has to be maintained to keep the
debt-G DP ratio
*
constant between periods t and t+N. Note that, to calculate sN
one needs projections
of the future real interest rates and growth rates of real GDP during
the next N
periods.

Then, define the N-period actual primary surplus-GDP ratio, s~, as
that
constant primar y surplus-GDP ratio whose present discounted value
is equal to the
present discounted value of the primary surplus-GDP ratios that are
actually planned
or expected to prevail between periods t and t+N. Then, the N-peri
od primary gap,
N

GAP t

*
a
, is defined as the excess of sN
over sN.

Note that when N

~

1, the

construction of the N-period primary gap requires forecasts not only of
future interest
rates and growth rates, but also of future primary surpluses. The
lazy person's or
myopic N-period primary gap, MGA Pf , shortcuts this · need for predict
ing future
primary surpluses by considering the excess of the N-period require
d primary

* over
surplu s-GDP ratio, sN,
the current primary surplus-GDP ratio, st, instead of over
the N-peri od actual primary surplu s-GDP ratio, s~. Obviously, when
N = 1, the
one-period required primary gap GAP} and the myopic one-period
primar y gap
MGAP i coincide and that the calculation of MGAP} does not require
any forecasts
other than those going into the calculation of the current real interest
rate and current
growth rate of real GDP.
Next,

we can define the constant primary surplus-GDP ratio that ensures
long-r un solvency which we shall call the permanent required primar
y surplus-GDP

ratio sCD*.

The calculation of s* requires estimates of the long-r un real interest
rate
CD
(the interna l rate of return on a real consol or index-linked perpet
uity) and the
long-r un growth rate of real GDP. Note that if the long-r un interest
rate exceeds the
1
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long-run growth rate, the required permanent surplus-GDP ratio is not only the
constant primary surplus-GDP ratio that, if maintained indefinitely, would ensure
government solvency.

It is also the constant primary surplus-GDP ratio that will

ensure that, ultimately, the debt-GDP ratio does not exceed any finite upper limit
(including its current value).
The permanent primary gap, GAJ>% ,is the excess of the permanent required
primary surplus-GDP ratio s* over the permanent actual primary surplus-GDP ratio
CD
sa. The permanent primary gap was proposed in Buiter [1983, 1985 and 1990) as a
CD
measure of the the magnitude of the permanent correction required to the annuitized
present discounted value of current and expected future primary surplus-GDP ratios in
order to ensure government solvency.

The measure is silent on whether the correction

should involve tax increases (including increases in seigniorage revenue) or spending
cuts.

Finally, the myopic permanent primary gap, MGAP~ , is the excess of the
permanent required primary surplus-GDP ratio, s*, over the current primary
CD
surplus-GDP ratio, st, instead of over s!. 1s
One feasible empirical approach is the one followed in Blanchard, Chouraqui,
Hagemann and Sartor [1990)

= 1 and 5
N = 40 years.

primary gap measure for N
primary gap calculation for

which implements empirically the myopic N-period
years and attempts a preliminary N-period
Other measures of the primary gaps for the

European countries have been computed by Wickens [1992).
Our own calculations of the one-period primary gap GAP 1 and the myopic
permanent primary gap MGAPCD are given in Tables II.4 .and II.5.
Table II.4 first gives the EC forecasts for real GDP growth, the implicit real
interest rate and the primary surplus for 1992, as well as the 1991 debt-GDP ratio.
The last two columns provide the required one period primary surplus s* and the
1
!-period primary gap, GAP 1 for 1992.
Table II.5 assumes a 3 % long run growth rate of real GDP and a 5 % per

20

annum long-run real interest rate for all EC countries.

Column 3 has the same 1991

debt-GDP ratios as Table II.4, and the last two columns give, respectively, the
required

permanent

primary surplus-GDP

ratio

and

the excess of the required

permanent primary surplus-GDP ratio over the primary surplus-GDP ratio forecast for
1992 by the EC.

Note that higher real interest rates or a lower real growth rate

would imply larger primary gaps (increasing, for each 1% increase in the real interest
rate or reduction in the real growth rate, by a percentage of GDP equal to the debt to
GDP ratio).
There is reason to believe that the EC forecasts of the primary surplus-GDP
ratios for 1992 are rather optimistic.

Table II.6 gives the excess of the 1992 primary

surplus-GDP ratios forecast by the EC over those forecast (six months later) by the
OECD.
Table 11.5 shows that the required permanent primary surplus-GDP ratio is quite
large for countries with a high debt to GDP ratio (2.5% of GDP for Belgium, 2.0% for
Ireland, 1.9% for Italy and 1.9% for Greece).

However, while Belgium and Ireland

have large primary surpluses in excess of the required permanent balance, so that their
debt to GDP ratio will be falling over time,

Greece and Italy show actual primary

deficits and large required permanent surpluses so that the myopic permanent primary
gaps are large.

In the case of Italy the EC has an optimistic forecast for the 1992

primary balance of 0.7% (of GDP) surplus; given a required permanent surplus of 1.9%,
a (permanently sustained) improvement in the primary balance of 1.2% of GDP would
be needed to ensure solvency of the Italian Treasury.1 6

Similarly, in Greece the

respective figures are a -0.5% actual primary deficit, a 1.9% required permanent surplus
and a 2.4% myopic permanent primary gap.
Table 11.5 also shows significant myopic permanent primary gaps for the United
Kingdom (2.4% of GDP), Germany (1.5%) and Spain (1.4%).

As was pointed out

already, however, the U.K. situation is biased by a large cyclical primary deficit; the
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cyclically adjusted or structural primary gap would be much smalle
r for this country.
Germany, instead, is still expected to exhibit healthy growth in
the EC forecasts for
1992, so that its actual primary deficit represents a structural
deficit associated with
the unification costs.
Finally, France, Denmark, Portugal and Luxembourg show
negative myopic permanent primary gaps that imply "supersolven
cy" and indeed a
long-r un falling debt to GDP ratio (assuming unchanged
primary surpluses and
economic conditions).
The single period primary gaps reported in Table II.4 are differe
nt (and usually
smaller) for a number of countries, relative to those computed
in Table II.5 using
(assumed) long term values for interest rates, growth rates and
inflation rates. The
reasons for these differences are quite important and worth discus
sing given their policy
implications.

Estimates of the long-r un real rate of interest tend to be obtain
ed from
two sources: for the UK from the index-linked government bonds
issued since the early
years of the Thatc her era and for the rest of the universe by
looking at long-term
fixed rate nominal government debt and guessing a long-run rate
of inflation.
There are three reasons why in 1991 the excess of the one-period
interest rate
over the one-period growth rate differs· from its longe
r-run counterpart.
First, unlike our long interest rate, which in principle is calcul
ated using the
current long market rate, our one-period "effective" rate is calcul
ated by dividing the
actual interest payments by the face value of the debt.

The effective interest rate on

the existing stock of debt will tend to be lower than actual curren
t market rate for
new debt, when interest rates are at historically high levels (as
they are today), with
the magnitude of the difference depending on the matur ity struct
ure of the debt.
Second, the use of privileged forms of financing (such as low
interest postal
deposits) permanently lowers the (average) implicit interest rate
below the long-term
Treas ury bond yields that lie behind the myopic permanent prima
ry gap calculations.
Third, unusually high current real growth rates and unusually low
current real interest
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rates bias the single-period required primary surplus-GDP ratio downwards relative to
any multi-period required primary surplus-GDP ratio.17
The empirical weight of these factors is quite important.

For example, the

one-period primary gaps for Germany, the U.K., Spain and Greece are lower (at 0.5%,
2.1%, 0.5% and 0.8 of GDP respectively) than the myopic permanent primary gap with
r=5% and g=3%

(at 1.5%, 2.4%, 1.4% and 2.4 of GDP respectively).

Conversely,

one-period primary gaps are larger in Italy than in the long run exercise (as the one
year real interest rate vs. growth differential was actually close to 3% rather than the
2% assumed in the myopic permanent gap calculations.).
In summary, while primary gaps (except for the non-myopic permanent primary
gap which we do not try to calculate) are not by themselves measures of debt
sustainability, they are useful complements to other measures of solvency; inferences
about sustainability derived from primary gaps also tend to be consistent with those
derived from other tests.

In particular, Italy and Greece need major primary fiscal

corrections in order to avoid insolvency; Germany will at some point have to deal with
its structural deficit, while the UK primary gap is mostly driven by cyclical factors.
Belgium and Ireland will have to continue their recent policies of large primary
surpluses if they wish to achieve further reductions in their debt to GDP ratio.

In

France, Denmark, Portugal and Luxembourg, present policies are consistent with long
term solvency.

II.4 WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO MEET THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA?

While the primary gap calculations suggest the minimum amount of fiscal
adjustment required to stabilize the debt-GDP ratio, the actual Maastricht objectives
are much more restrictive since they require a reduction in the debt-GDP ratio towards
the 60% target.
issues.

The goal of this subsection is therefore that of exploring two related

First, what would be the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio if the deficit
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reference value and the inflation target are reached by end-1996 (or end-1998) ?
Second, how large a primary and overall fiscal adjustment would be required to satisfy
the debt ratio criterion by end-1996 (or end-1998) ?
Consider first the "What happens to the debt?" question.

Starting from the

debt-GDP ratio inherited at the end of 1991, debt
91 and assuming that the deficit
target of 3% of GDP is reached on time (by the target date of December 31 1996 or
December 31 1998), what will the debt-GDP ratio be on the target date (debt
96 or
debt ) ? From equation (I.1) we see that to answer this question we need the
98
growth rate of nominal GDP 7Pt and the deficit-GDP ratio deft for each period from
1992 to the end of 1996 or 1998.

In Table II. 7 we consider two pairs of scenarios.

The first pair, scenarios (a) and (b) outline an extremely disciplined fiscal adjustment
where each EC country that is now above the 3% deficit and the 5% nominal GDP
growth will reach these levels (through gradual adjustments) by end-1996 (in scenario
(a)) or by end-1998 (in scenario (b)).18

The second pair, scenarios (c) and (d) present

hypothetical cases where these deficit and nominal GDP growth targets are achieved
immediately in 1992.

They show the debt to GDP ratio obtained by end-1996

(scenario (c)) or end-1998 (scenario (d)).

This second pair of scenarios is presented to

show that, relative to scenarios (a) and (b), an immediate convergence of inflation rates
can partially undo the effects of a substantial fiscal retrenchment on the debt-GDP
ratio.
Table II. 7 makes it abundantly clear that satisfying the deficit criterion and
meeting the inflation target together would not do much to reduce the debt-GDP ratio
even in the hypothetical case in which these targets were reached right away in 1992
(scenarios (c) and (d)).

For example, in the most favorable scenario, Italy only lowers

its debt-GDP ratio from 101.2 in 1991 to 90.2.

The same point holds for high

inflation countries such as Greece (high debt) and Portugal (low debt), where, however,
the debt to GDP ratio decreases relatively more in scenarios characterized by a
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combination of slow inflation and deficit adjustment. 19 The high debt and low inflation
countries (Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium) do effectively nothing to their
debt-GD P ratios when they meet the deficit targets.
The next question we address is "Starting from the 1991 inherited debt-GDP
ratio, what constant deficit-GDP ratio will cause the debt-GDP target to be reached
on time?". We again consider two pairs of scenarios (for the excess debtors in 1991
only).

In Table II.8, scenarios (a) and (b) have nominal GDP growth declining

gradually to 5%.

The target date for the debt ratio is end-1996 for scenario (a) and

end-1998 for scenario (b).

Scenarios (c) and (d) consider the case in which the

nominal GDP growth target is reached immediately in 1992 and maintained thereafter.
The target date for the debt ratio remains end-1996
(scenario (c)) or end-1998
(scenario (d)).
Clearly, for countries like Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Greece, Table II.8 describes
the economics of the lunatic asylum.
considerable pain.

For the Netherlands and Portugal there would be

Only Denmark would have an easy ride.

To try and achieve the

debt target even by the end of 1998 would require hefty to very hefty overall budget
surpluses. For Belgium the turnaround relative to 1991 would be about 11.5 % of
GDP.
Table II.9 shows the 1991 primary deficit-GDP ratio, and the constant primary
deficit-GDP ratio that achieves the debt target by end-1996 or end-1998, on the
assumption of a 5 percent real interest rate and a 3 percent growth rate of real GDP.
Table II.9 confirms the story of Table II.8: out of the seven countries~ that do not
satisfy the debt criterion in 1991, only Denmark can relax, reduce its primary surplus
and still meet the debt target by the end of 1996 or 1998.

Belgium and Italy would

have to experience Mexican-style increases in primary surpluses in order to meet the
debt target by the end of 1996 or 1998.
Would the required adjustment be more realistic if the seven countries m Table
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II.8 and II.9 were only required to move halfway to the debt target of 60% of GDP by
1996 or 1998?

Tables II.10 and II.11 provide the answer.
debt-GDP ratio and 60% is denoted d*.

The average of the 1991

While the figures in Tables II.10 and II.11 are clearly less extravagant than their
counterparts in Tables II.8 and II.9, the required primary adjustment (comparing the
figures in the column below -s

91 in Table II.11 with those in the columns to its right)
is still massive for Italy, Belgium and Greece. Comparing Table II.11 with Table II.5,
we also note that the primary surpluses required to get even only halfway to the
Maastricht debt target by 1998 is significantly higher than the primary surpluses
required to ensure solvency for all seven countries currently exceeding the Maastricht
debt norm (Italy (6.1% vs 1.9%), Belgium (8.2% vs 2.5%), Greece (6.9% vs 1.9%),
Ireland (5.3% vs 2.0%), the Netherlands (3.2% vs 1.5%), Portugal (2.4% vs 1.2%) and
even Denmark (2.4% vs 1.3%)).
We conclude that while especially Greece, Italy, Belgium and Ireland require
serious fiscal retrenchment, any attempt to get even halfway to the Maastricht debt
targets (and at the latest day) is likely to involve serious fiscal overkill.

The blatantly

unrealistic debt target clearly is not helpful for these countries in designing effective
fiscal programs.

Ill. THE MAASTR ICHT BUDGET ARY GUIDELINES: A CRITIQUE.

In this section we use economic theory and econometric empirical evidence to
evaluate the pros and cons of the Maastricht budgetary fiscal .· guidelines in greater
detail. 20
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ID.LON APPROPRIATE INDICATORS OF GOVERNMENT DEBT AND DEFICIT.

ID.LL
Gross versus net debt.
'
.

The debt criterion is defined in terms of the nominal or face value of the gross
financial debt of the general government 21 rather than the economically more relevant

net non-monetary liabilities of the consolidated general government and central bank
sector2 2. The two concepts differ in four respects.
First, since to a close approximation the gross financial debt of the general
government differs from the gross non-monetary liabilities of the consolidated general
government and central bank sector by the amount of the monetary base, in practice
the criterion used at Maastricht penalizes the countries that because of historical
accident or past policies have a high ratio of monetary base to GDP. 23
Second, general government gross financial assets (even quite readily marketable,
liquid financial assets) are not netted out against gross financial liabilities.

To consider

the importance of this point, we can compare the value of the net debt of the general
government (computed by the OECD), which differs from the gross debt by the value
of the financial assets (but not the value of the public enterprises and other "real"
assets) of the general government.

As Table III.1 shows, the differences between net

and gross debt can be sizable in several countries.

For example, in the Netherlands

the gap between the gross and the net debt is equal to 20% of GDP (78% for the
gross debt as opposed to 59% for the net debt).
A country could achieve a reduction in its gross debt just by liquidating its
financial assets and using the proceeds to redeem part of the gross debt; such a
financial operation would leave the net debt unaffected but could significantly reduce
the gross debt.
Third, in all European countries the general government owns public enterprises
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whose value should be counted in order to get a meaningful measure of the
net
liabilities of the public sector.
Privatization receipts, which should be counted as
financing (that is, as equivalent, to a first approximation, to government borrowi
ng),
can be used to reduce conventional government debt issues, thus relaxing, under
the
Maastricht rules, the financial constraints on the government.
In the convenient
benchmark case where the government sells a state enterprise for its post-privatizat
ion
market value and where this private market value is equal to its continuation value
in
the public sector (the present discounted value of its cash flow in the public sector),
the correctly measured net worth of the government sector is not altered by
the
privatization. 24
This discussion makes clear that financial engineering through the liquidation of
general government financial assets and the privatization of public enterprises can
be
used to reach the Maastricht debt and deficit targets without there being any
real
fiscal adjustment.

Note that this lowers the effective cost to the government of using
privatization to finance public spending, thus creating a bias towards reducing the
size

of the public sector, inclusive of state enterprises.

Even where privatization is desirable

for efficiency reasons, it is bad economic policy to do the right (structural) thing
for
the wrong (financing) reasons, especially when the financial sleight of hand involved
can
come back to haunt one in the future.
Fourth, Bovenberg [1991] and Bovenberg and Petersen [1991] have pointed out
that differences in the way the government finances its pension obligations to
its
employees can have important implications for its longer-run financial position.
The
two extremes are on the one hand the Netherlands, whose supplementary civil service
pensions are fully funded, and on the other hand Germany and France, where there
is
no funding of public sector pensions of any magnitude. Social security pensions tend
to
be fully unfunded throughout the EC.
Most countries make pension scheme premiums tax deductible while benefits are
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taxable.

A few, however, have non-deductible premiums and non-taxable benefits.

Other things being equal, the postponement of taxes under the first scheme relative to
the second scheme, amounts to a loan by the government to the pension funds and its
contributors.

To make the financial position of two countries operating under the two

different tax systems comparable, the value of the implicit loan could be subtracted
from the conventionally measured public debt.
After correcting for differences in funding practice of public sector pensions and
social security pensions and in the tax treatment of pension fund premiums and
benefits, the corrected general government debt of the Netherlands amounts to 33
percent of GDP in 1989 (against an uncorrected figure of 80 percent of GDP).
Germany moves from an uncorrected figure of 43 percent of GDP to a corrected figure
of 38 percent, France from 47 percent to 45 percent and the UK from 39 percent to 3
percent!

ID.1.2. The nominal deficit guideline.

The Maastricht deficit guideline refers to the nominal, cum interest, overall
(current and capital) fiscal balance of the general government.

This does not appear to

be a desirable fiscal target or constraint.

III.1.2a Inflation differentials.

The authors of the Maastricht Treaty seem unconcerned about and/or unaware of
the distinction between nominal and real interest rates.

A large component of interest

payments in several EC countries represents a purely nominal rather than a real
interest burden.

Therefore, a fiscal guideline based on nominal cum interest deficits is

not very appealing as long as inflation rates among the EC countries are not equalized.
Note that the inflation convergence criterion permits a country to exceed the average
inflation rate of the lowest three inflation countries by 1.5 percent per annum and still
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to qualify for participation in EMU.

We can expect that, if and when the member

states of the EG have a common currency, there will be no sizable permanent nationa
l
or regional differences in inflation rates.2 6 Until we get to that point, however,
there
are likely to be differences that should be allowed for in the any deficit criterion.

Ill.1.2b Real growth differentials.

Historically, growth rates of real GDP have differed significantly among EC
members. Convergence in growth rates of real GDP is also not one of the Maastri
cht
criteria.

Quite the opposite in fact applies: economic and social solidarity will require
the real growth rates of the poorer members of the Community to exceed those of
the
richer ones for decades to come.

The debt to GDP ratio stabilizing budget deficit is of

course different for countries with different growth rates of real output.

Countries with

a higher growth rate of real GDP can ceteris paribus safely support a higher
deficit-GDP ratio.

ID.1.3. Tax-smoothing and Keynesian arguments in favor of countercyclical budget
deficits.
A correct interpre tation of the deficit guideline is crucial in assessing how rigidly
the deficit ceiling will be applied. There are many positive and normative reasons
why
fiscal deficits would emerge during recessions.

First, automatic stabilizers are at work.

Many major areas of public spending (e.g. unemployment compensation, social welfare
expenditure, early retirement benefits, job retraining and subsidies for ailing firms)
are
inherently counter-cyclical, so that portions of government spending tend to
rise
automatically during recessions, while tax revenues linked to the level of econom
ic
activity fall.
Moreover, both Keynesian and neoclassical (tax-smoothing) models of fiscal deficits
suggests the optimality of deficit spending during recessions.

The neoclassical theory of
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the optimal use of distortionary taxes suggests that temporary (exogenous) increases in
expenditures and temporary (exogenous) reductions in the tax base should be reflected
in temporary government deficits and permanently higher tax rates.

In a Keynesian

framework, the operation of automatic stabilizers is often reinforced by discretionary
demand management intervention.
Does Maastricht allow for counter-eyclical deficit spending ?

At best, the

wording of the Treaty is ambiguous on whether recurrent fiscal deficits due to cyclical
downturns in excess of the reference value would be allowed.

The Protocol states that

a deficit in excess of 3% might be allowed if it "is only exceptional and temporary and
the ratio remains close to the reference value".

While the concepts of temporary and

exceptional are are vague, one interpretation of this wording is that deficits in excess of
3% due to cyclical factors such a recession might not be deemed excessive.
interpretation

is

supported

by

the

Article

104c

reference

to

the

This

"medium

term... budgetary position of the Member State" as being relevant to the assessment of
the existence of excessive deficits.

On the other hand, Article 104c specifies that the

deficit excess should be "exceptional" as well as "temporary";

the stress on the

"exceptional" suggests an interpretation where regular deficits in excess of 3 percent of
GDP due to cyclical factors might not be considered acceptable.26

ID.1.4. The Golden Rule of public sector investment.
The Treaty refers, without mentioning it by name, to the "golden rule" of
government financing: balance the current budget and borrow no more than the amount
of gross public sector capital formation.

The German negotiators were (for domestic

constitutional reasons) especially keen on this rule for virtuous borrowing.
The practical problems associated with any attempt to distinguish consumption
spending from investment are well known.

"Current" expenditures on education, such

as teachers' salaries are an obvious example.

Even if that problem is solved, the
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"golden rule" for financing government expenditure makes no economic sense

and can

lead to bad policy choices.
First, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with borrowing to finance public
consumption expenditures, even if we ignore tax-smoothing arguments and possible
Keynesian benefits from government borrowing in economies with widespread capacity
underutilization.

The permanent income and life cycle hypotheses have formalized the

insight that it is desirable to smooth consumption over time and across states of nature
when current income streams are variable and/or uncertain.

While consumption

smoothing in the face of a temporary decline in income can of course be achieved
without borrowing (by running down a positive stock of (financial) wealth that has
been accumulated for that purpose), it may, at certain times and for some economic
agents, be better to smooth consumption by varying one's financial liabilities.

As long

as the borrower realizes that, ceteris paribus, future consumption will have to decline in
present value by as much as current consumption increases, there is no prima fade
reason to second guess his intertemporal choices and forbid consumption loans.

An

obvious exception to this laisser faire attitude would have to be made if there is
convincing evidence that market failure has resulted in saving rates lower than· the
social optimum.
Second, many socially useful and desirable government investment projects do not,
either directly (say, through user fees) or indirectly (say, by boosting the productivity
of the private economy and thus the tax base) increase the future balance of
government receipts over non-interest expenditures by an amount at least equal in
present discounted value to the cost of these projects.

In that case financing by

borrowing must sooner or later be supplemented by policies to raise revenues or cut
other non-interest expenditures to make up the shortfall.

Unlike a private firm, a

government will often knowingly engage in investment projects whose returns need not
(exclusively) take the form of enhanced future cash flow for the government.

The
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social rate of return on a government investment project need bear no relation to its
total (direct and indirect) effect on the government's future cash flow 27 • To the extent
that the government does not appropriate the social returns to public sector investment,
naive application of the "golden rule" of public sector financing may be a recipe for
weakening the public sector balance sheet that can ultimately lead to insolvency, even
if the social rate of return is at least equal to the government's cost of borrowing.

ID.2. SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF A FISCAL CONTRACTION IN
THE EC.

Maastricht elevates a number slightly below the current EC average debt-GD P
ratio to one-side d or asymmetric debt norm (values above the norm are frowned upon,
values below the norm are not). A number significantly below the current EC average
deficit-GDP ratio is likewise made into a one-side d or asymmetric deficit norm. If
pursuit of these norms is taken seriously over the next few years, fiscal policy in the
EC will be subject to a contractionary bias. There is no mention in the Treaty of the
need for a less restrictive average stance of monetary policy to compensate for this
contractionary fiscal bias.
Rather little is known· empirically about the long-run effects on the level and
growth rate of real output of a fiscal contraction.

If the fiscal contraction takes the

form of a cut in productive public expenditure (such as public sector investment that is
not a close substitut e for private capital formation) the effects on the long-run output
level and (in endogenous growth models) output growth rates may well be negative.
The Maastricht Treaty tries to guard against this by being more lenient about
borrowing to finance public sector investment.
A permanent cut in public sector consumption would, in the simple representative
agent model, simply boost private consumption one-for-one, with no effect on private
capital formation.

In most other standard models, (such as OLG models) there are
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positive effects on private investment (and thus on the long-run level and perhaps
growth rate of real GDP) from cuts in public consumption spending.
Fiscal contraction through tax increases or through cuts in transfer payments and
subsidies will have long-run effects on the level and growth rate of output that are
very specific to the precise instrument chosen (think of an increase in the corporate
profits tax versus a cut in unemployment benefits).
The short-run effect on economic activity of public spending cuts or tax increases
works mainly through aggregate demand acting on output and employment because of
short-ru n rigidities in money prices and wages and the presence of liquidity constrained
economic agents.

A standard model (the Dornbusch version of the Mundell-Fleming

model) has a negative effect on aggregate demand of an unexpected, immediately
implemented fiscal contraction.

The depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate

and, in a large economy, the decline in interest rates caused by the fiscal contraction
mitigate but do not negate completely the negative effect on output and employment.
In other words, government borrowing crowds out private borrowing, but less than
one-for-one.
Taking Maastricht seriously would in all likelihood lead to a multi-ye ar sequence
of tax increases and spending cuts for the EC as a whole.

The standard model also

has the property that the current effect of anticipated future fiscal tightening is
expansionary.

Today's long interest rate falls and todays exchange rate depreciates, in

response to the anticipated decline in future short interest rates associated with the
future fiscal contraction.
As the future materializes, of course, the expansionary
announcement effects wear off and the contractionary effects of concurrent fiscal
retrenchment dominate.
The announcement of a sequence of fiscal tightening, beginning immediately,
would be expansionary only if the scale of the spending cuts and tax increases were to
increase over time.

It therefore seems likely that the impact effect on the level of
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economic activity of attempts to satisfy the Maastricht criteria will be negative.

Three

independent model simulations by the OECD (Englander and Egebo [1992]) using
INTERLINK, by Giovannini and McKibbin [1992] using the MSG model and by the
IMF (in a confidential study), support this conclusion, although the quantitative
magnitudes involved differ considerably.
A key problem in evaluating the consequences of attempts to satisfy the
Maastricht criteria is the specification of the base-line or reference scenario, that is, the
counterfactual to the pursuit of the fiscal norms of EMU.

It clearly would make no

sense to assume that, absent Maastricht, the 12 EC members (or the 11 pre September
1992 ERM members) would, until end-1996 or end-1998, simply maintain their current
deficit-GDP ratios (or even their cyclically adjusted or structural deficit-GDP ratios).
With or without EMU, Italy should (and in all probability would) take steps to reduce
its fiscal imbalance.

The same is true for Greece and to a lesser extent, also for

Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.28
Recent press reports have referred to a confidential IMF study on the economic
effects of Maastricht.

On the basis of such press reports and a press release by the

French government 29 the following results can be inferred.

The medium-term

(1992-1996) IMF simulations assume for the reference scenario that primary budget
deficit-GDP ratios are held constant from 1992 on. 30
scenarios" are considered.

Two alternative "Maastricht

Both scenarios show the consequences of the gradual

implementation of policy measures to achieve, by 1996, the required degree of
convergence of budget deficits and inflation rates, but not necessarily of the debt-GDP
ratios.

Scenario I (Convergence with Risk Premium Adjustment) assumes that the

process of convergence gradually eliminates the risks of nonparticipation in stage 3 of
EMU and thus removes the interest differential between Germany and the other EMU
members.

Scenario II (Convergence without Risk Premium Adjustment) assumes that

despite the fiscal and inflation convergence, the interest differential between Germany
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and the rest persists at its 1992 level.31
Not surprisingly, the result is a deeper contraction in Scenario II (sans credibility)
than in Scenario I (mit credibility).

For the EC as a whole, the cumulative output

loss relative to the reference scenario over the period 1992-96 is 0.4 percent (of the
1992 level) in Scenario I and 0.8 percent in Scenario II. 32

Output growth rates are

above their reference levels before the end of the period in Scenario I.

The negative

output effects are concentrated overwhelmingly in Italy, especially in Scenario 2 where a
cumulative output loss of over 2% is incurred.33 34
Englander and Egebo [1992] take as their base-line or reference path the OECD
secretariat 1993 projections, which already contain short-term tightening of budgetary
policies and disinflationary monetary policies in line with the stated medium-te rm
objectives of national policy makers. 35

While Englander and Egebo report preciously

little quantitativ e information about their simulation (no information at all is given
about real GDP and only graphical information is provided about unemployment) their
findings appear consistent with the IMF simulations.
First, the extent to which the fiscal cut backs are contractionary depends to a
large extent on the fiscal- monetary policy mix adopted by Germany.

Tighter fiscal

policy and looser monetary policy in Germany minimize the output and unemployment
cost of achieving the Maastricht deficit and inflation criteria. 36
Second, for countries requiring major deficit reductions, the effect on economic
activity is negative, despite the interest rate reductions.

The unemployment rate in

Italy rises to almost 12 percent by the end of 1996 (more than 2 percentage points
above base line), while the Spanish unemployment rate reaches 16 percent in 1996,
about 1.5 percentage points above base line.

The impact on Denmark, Ireland, France

and the UK, countries whose required adjustments are minor, are small.
through a large transitional increase in unemployment.
debt-GDP

ratios

are

rather

small,

despite

the

Belgium goes

The simulated impacts on

sometimes

large

reductions

in

36

deficit-GDP ratios. 37 Finally, external spillovers beyond the EC are very modest. 38
Giovannini and McKibbin [1992] report qualitatively similar findings for the EC
countries, although the magnitudes involved are rather more dramatic. 3 9

The base line

has fiscal deficit-GDP ratios in Europe at their 1991 levels "for the foreseeable future".
Inflation converges to the German rate by 1996 due to the constraints imposed by the
EMS.

The Maastricht scenario has each country with a fiscal deficit above 3% of

GDP target at 3% of GDP by 1996. 4o
In the Maastricht scenario, Italy gets slaughtered.
about 11 percent relative to base line.

On impact output falls by

While the recovery is rather swift, even by

1996 output is still almost 1 percent below base line.

The proximate cause of this

recession is a very large increase in real interest rates. The culprit is the large
reduction in inflation (by more than 7 percent in 1992), the counterpart of the very
deep recession. 4 1.

Outside Italy, relative little happens, although Germany, with

contractionary monetary and fiscal policy, experiences a mild recession.
Our own view is that the output and unemployment costs of Maastricht are likely
to be somewhere between the excessively low estimates of the IMF (and the OECD)
and the implausibly high numbers of Giovannini and McKibbin.
It is worth noting that, while the three simulation studies did place the
Maastricht policy experiment in a global context, the average monetary-fiscal policy
mix for the Community as a whole in relation to the monetary-fiscal policy mixes in
North America and Japan appears not to have been a concern to the authors of the
Treaty, which maintains an inward-looking silence on this issue.

ID.3. PROS AND CONS OF VAGUENESS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
MAASTRICHT FISCAL CRITERIA.

In defense of the Maastricht guidelines, it is often argued that the two reference
values for deficits and debt will not be applied strictly, that all sorts of caveats
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(discussed above) would be taken into consideration and that a country whose deficit
and/or debt exceed the reference values may not be found to have "excessive" deficits
as long as it has made steady and substantial efforts in getting close(r) to them.

It

should also be noted, however, that another implication of the vagueness in the wording
of the Treaty is that irrelevant or inappropriate political considerations are likely to
play a role in the assessment of whether the fiscal convergence criteria have been met.
A number of strategic issues come to mind.

Suppose, for instance,, that a country

like Italy would be allowed to join EMU, having reduced its deficit from 11 % to a
level somewhat above the 3% reference value (4% of GDP for example) and having
reduced its debt to GDP ratio slowly but continuously by late 1996 or 1998.
Permission to join might be considered a reasonable and likely reward for such a
continuous and significant adjustment of the deficit and debt ratios.
Suppose, moreover, that a different country, for example Denmark, with a deficit
in 1992 close to 6.0% of GDP, were to make a much smaller fiscal adjustment and also
reduced its deficit to 4% of GDP by the EMU deadline.

Should Denmark then be

excluded from EMU in spite of having a deficit equal to the Italian one and a debt to
GDP ratio much smaller than the Italian one (61% of GDP against the Italian 107%
in 1992), simply

because of its lack of significant and continuous fiscal adjustment ?

Or should it be allowed to join because of its better overall fiscal and debt position,
reflecting Denmark's earlier fiscal retrenchment in the 1980s?
More generally, should countries like Denmark, Belgium and Ireland, that did
much of their "continuous and significant" fiscal adjustment during the 1980s be treated
more or less leniently than countries (like Italy and Greece) that will make most of
their adjustment in the 1990s at the earliest?

And how would the incentives for fiscal

retrenchment by countries such as Denmark be affected by the knowledge that they
might satisfy the fiscal criteria as long as their deficit and debt ratio values are no
higher than those of a country like Italy ?

Finally, how would the incentives of
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countries like Italy be affected by the knowledge that the reference values are not strict
and that other countries might also decide their adjustment effort on the basis of the
effort undertaken by a country like Italy ?

ID.4.

THE

RELATION

OF

THE

FISCAL

CRITERIA

TO

THE

OTHER

CONVERGENCE CRITERIA.
The budgetary norms are neither necessary, nor sufficient, nor necessarily useful
for satisfying the other convergence criteria in the Treaty of Maastricht.

We have

already discussed how the fiscal convergence criteria for joining EMU are linked to the
other convergence criteria, concerning the inflation rate, the interest rate and the
exchange rate.
Since the interest rate criterion is worded with reference to the interest rates of
the three member states that have the lowest inflation rates (rather than with reference
to the interest rates of the three member states with the lowest interest rates), there
could, in principle, be room for strategic behavior by member states.

For example, the

public debt of a country with falling but still high debt and deficit ratios might carry
a large international interest differential, reflecting both expectations of exchange rate
depreciation and sovereign default risk. In that case, the country would have a strong
incentive to be a very low inflation country because its low inflation would then be
used to define the interest rate criterion.
The interest rate criterion may well be hard to satisfy, even for a low inflation
country.

Interest rate differentials might persist because of risk premia reflecting the

market's perception of the odds that a country will not be allowed to join EMU (and
will therefore remain subject to devaluation risk) because of insufficient (albeit steady)
fiscal adjustment.

One could envisage self-fulfilling equilibria with a country being

excluded from EMU on the basis of the fiscal and interest rate criteria, despite a
significant reduction in its primary deficit, because nominal interest rates have remained
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high (reflecting currency realignment risk)" and have caused larger interest-inclusive
financial deficits.

While the 2% spread in rates allowed by the interest rate criterion

leaves some flexibility and implicitly recognizes the possibility of still wide interest
differentials, such scenarios cannot be dismissed.

ill.5. WHAT ARE THE EXTERNALITIES OF "EXCESSIVE DEFICITS"'!

Assuming that a bias towards "excessive" deficits exists, what is the nature of the
negative externalities that an excessive deficit in one country imposes on the other EC
countries ?

As mentioned in Section I, three kinds of externalities have been appealed

to as justifications for the fiscal rules: (a) fiscal bail-out externalities; (b) monetary
bail-out

externalities

and

(c) interest

rate,

exchange

rate or effective

demand

externalities, that is, international spillovers through market prices and the level of
economic activity.

ill.5.1. The fiscal bail-out argument.

This argument suggests that excessive deficits by a the government of a member
country might eventually lead to an unsustainable debt position and to a solvency crisis
that will force the member countries into a fiscal "bail-out" of the deviant country,
that is a net transfer from solvent to insolvent governments.
Germany has been especially concerned about this bail-out risk and has insisted
on the introduction of language in the Treaty stressing that neither the Community
agencies nor the member states are under any obligation to bail out insolvent member
states.

The "no bail-out principle" is stated clearly in Article 104b of the Treaty: if a

member country fails to service its debt, there will be no bail-out by the Community
or by other member states; the defaulting member country and its creditors will bear
the consequences of such a fiscal crisis.
Underlying the fiscal bail-out argument are two assumptions.

The first is that
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private markets are not going to offer effective discipline against deviant fiscal behavior.
The second is that the no bail-out clause of the Treaty (Article 104b) is likely to be
ineffective and needs backing up with a rule that, if enforced, will make the no
bail-out clause moot, because no default will ever occur.
As regards the first of these propositions, it is frequently argued that with a fixed
exchange rate (and a fortiori with a common currency), national governments that issue
debt denominated in the common currency will not be subject to effective discipline
and restraint by the financial markets.

This argument has rather little going for it.

Assume that EMU is a fact and that a common currency (the ECU) has been
adopted.

If, for instance, the German government, unwilling to face paying the fiscal

price of German unification, were to continue issuing large amounts of debt (now
denominated in ECUs), it would in due course have to pay a growing sovereign risk
premium in its ECU interest rate.

In addition, and more important in practice, it

would sooner or later encounter credit rationing.

It would be unable to sell debt in

any currency and at any rate of interest.
The disappearance of the national currency implies that exchange rate risk or
currency risk disappears as a source of national interest differentials.

Other forms of

risk (especially sovereign default risk) will continue to be priced in the market and to
be reflected in quantitative constraints on borrowing.

These sovereign risk premia

should be incurred only by the deviant countries through an increase in their country
risk premium, but should not affect the interest rates of other Community borrowers.

It has been argued that market discipline through higher interest rates for
countries following undisciplined fiscal policies might not work if financial markets are
not very good in assessing the default risk of a deviant country (see Goldstein and
Woglom [1992) for evidence on risk premia in the US municipal bond market).
However, if the probability of a fiscal bail-out is close to zero and if the European
central bank is credibly committed to price stability, imperfections in the capital
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market that lead to weak market discipline should be of no concern to the Community
since there is no reason why these imperfections will affect Community-wide interest
rates.

Specifically, if a fiscal crisis and default does not lead to external effects the

costs of these market imperfections will be borne only by the defaulting country and its
creditors.
For the proper functioning of the national and international credit markets it is
necessary that the member states of the EMU (and the supranational organs of the
Community) make it absolutely clear and credible, that national debt is and remains
the exclusive obligation and responsibility of the national government in question and of
those who, now or in the future, pay taxes to this government. This is exactly the
purpose of the "no bail-out clause" 4 2 . The same is of course true without EMU and
without a common currency.

Whether or not such a formal commitment against debt

bail outs can be made credible is a practical political issue.
is not difficult in practice.

Experience shows that this

For instance, in the US this has long been the case for the

debt of individual states and of local government units. 4 3
Some observers have argued that, regardless of formal or informal statements
about a "no bail-out" rule, the Community would be hard-pressed not to intervene and
support a member country whose excessive deficits had brought it to a financial crisis
with serious risk of default.

The very idea of an economic, monetary and political

union, so the argument goes, implies a degree of 'solidarity' or 'cohesion' that would
imply some form of support in case of a fiscal crisis.

The presence of an explicit no

bail-out clause in the Treaty, however, suggests that this extension of the concept of
solidarity was not what the authors of the Treaty had in mind.

In any case, solidarity

or cohesion considerations suggest aid from the rich to the poor, not from the fiscally
sound to the fiscally unsound.
We also see little reason to believe that intra-Co mmunity international solidarity
will be strengthened by EMU, or that EMU will strengthen the bargaining power of
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debtor governments vis-a-vis creditor governments.

What, after all, can post-EMU

debtor governments threaten creditor governments with that they cannot already
threaten them with today?
currencies?

That they would abandon EMU and restore their national

How does this threaten creditor governments?

some or all of their internally or externally held debt?

That they would default or

That option is equally available

with or without a common currency, and the costs to the defaulter are well-known. 44
The hub of the fiscal externality argument is that a national government debt
default

may

have

adverse

systemic

effects,

say

for

the

functioning

of

the

community-wide financial system (or for a key part of it like the banking system or
the payments system).

If the scale of the default is large and if a significant share of

the defaulting government's debt is held by private institutions (such as commercial
banks and other deposit-taking institutions) that are vulnerable to sudden "runs", that
is, to demands for immediate conversion of their liabilities into cash, a financial panic
and liquidity crisis could result.

While the contagion and bandwagon effects that

propagate such confidence crises are not very well understood (but see Diamond and
Dybvig [1983] and Eaton [1987] for informative analytical approaches to the issue),
experience teaches us that they can cause serious damage.

Note, however, that the

damage can be limited through cooperative action by the national governments of the
other Community members and the supranational bodies.

Such concerted support need

not imply, de jure or de facto, that the defaulting government is relieved of its debt
burden.

Consider, for instance, the case where a large chunk of the defaulting national

government's debt is held by that nation's banking system (or indeed by another
member country's banking system)45.

The European System of Central Banks (ESCB)

and the European Central Bank (ECB) can play the "lender of last resort II function
without "taking over" the debt of the defaulting government and without raising the
trend rate of growth of the nominal money stock in the EC as a whole.

Moral hazard

problems can be avoided by making sure that policy of safeguarding the payments
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system ('saving the banks') goes hand-in -hand with the realization of appropriate
losses by those owning equity in the banks and with the dismissal of the banks'
managers.

ID.5.2. The monetary bail-out argument.
The second half of the bail-out argument is that the fiscal norms are necessary to
render it impossible (or at any rate unlikely) that the new ESCB will effectively be
forced to monetize the budget deficits of countries without fiscal discipline.

This can

be viewed as a special case of the general fiscal bail-out argument, with the ECSB
acting as the fiscal agent in the transfer to the defaulting debtor government.

Fear

that a fiscal and financial crisis in one EC country could spread to other countries
(whether through psychological bandwagon and contagion effects or through portfolio
exposure) might force the future European Central Bank to inject excessive liquidity in
the EC area and thus to create monetary and price instability.
The possibility that a fiscal crisis in a member country might lead to an indirect
bail-out through a debt monetization on the part of the European central bank is
unlikely.

The

Maastricht

Treaty

is

very

clear

about

the

principle

of

the

"independence" of the European central bank, the primacy of the objective of "price
stability" and the elimination of any privileged financing of the deficits by the
country's central bank.
The formal independence of the proposed ESCB and ECB vis
governments of the member states and the

a

vis the

supranational authorities of the European

Communities is greater even than the formal independence of the Bundesbank today.
This holds for the appointment procedures for members of the Executive Board and
Governing Council and for the absolute ban on overdrafts and other credit facilities
with the ESCB and ECB for all EC, national, regional, local and other public
authorities.

The ban on direct purchases of government debt instruments by the ESCB
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is of course only cosmetic, since "indirect" purchases (that is all purchases of debt
instruments in the secondary markets) are permitted.
The one major formal blot on the ESCB independence banner is the vague and
confusing verbiage in the Treaty concerning the powers of the Council of Ministers over
the

common

external

exchange

rate

(Article

109).

Substantive

central

bank

independence requires that the central bank be in charge of exchange rate policy.

If

the Council of Ministers were to have power over exchange rate determination, or even
just power to choose the broad outline of the exchange rate regime (fixed versus
managed floating etc.), then the independence of the ESCB would be seriously
undermined. Would the Council of Ministers, for instance, have the authority to decide
that the value of the ECU should be fixed in terms of some basket of non-ECU
currencies?

If the answer is "yes", the independence of the ESCB would be vacuous,

as it would no longer be able to pursue price stability as it saw fit, except to the
extent that the ESCB could assume a leadership role vis-a-vis the central banks of the
rest of the world, just like the Bundesbank has today within the EMS. 4 6
Even if a central bank is formally completely independent of the executive and
legislative powers, it remains possible that its effective or substantive independence is
severely restricted by other agents (such as the ministry of finance) who can maneuver
it into a position where its domain of choice is very limited.

While this is in principle

a possibility with the ESCB, it will not -be relevant in practice because after EMU any
national fiscal authority will be in a considerably weaker position vis a vis the new
ESCB, than it is today vis a vis its own national central bank. The ESCB will be (to
an

even

greater

degree

than

the

Bundesbank

is

today)

the

"leader"

in

the

monetary-fiscal game of chicken (see Sargent [1986, pp. 19-39]) at least until the
supranational executive and legislative institutions of the EC are as strong relative to
the ESCB as today's national Treasuries and Legislatures are in relation to their
national central banks.
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ID.5.3. International spillovers with solvent governments.

Another class of arguments suggesting the need for internationally agreed rules for
fiscal discipline is based on international spillovers of economic policy, and specifically
on interest rate, exchange rate and activity externalities, that are present even when
there is no risk of government default.

Since the spending and financing decisions of

even fully solvent governments spill over into other countries (through integrated credit
markets, goods markets and factor markets) in ways that are not fully taken into
account and valued by national governments, uncoordinated national fiscal policies
might

lead

to

spending

levels

and/or

fiscal

deficits

that

are

suboptimal

and

beggar-thy"-neighbor.
One often hears references to the "external effects" of government budget deficits
(see e.g. Bovenberg et. al. [1991] and Commission of the European Communities [1991]).
If, for instance, the German government finances its deficit in the capital markets, this

will ceteris paribus raise real interest rates in Germany and in all countries tied to
Germany

through

efficient

capital

markets
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From

this

premise,

which

is

non-controversial ( unless one is a believer in Ricardian equivalence) it is then inferred
that such negative external effects must be opposed and, if possible, avoided altogether.
Both the designation "external effects" and the characterization "negative" require
further scrutiny.
When Bonzo increases his purchases of bananas in a competitive market with an
upward-sloping banana supply schedule, the price of bananas will rise.

This is good

news for all those who are long in bananas (net banana exporters) and bad news for all
those who are short in bananas (net banana importers).

The increase in the price of

bananas is exactly what ought to happen if the market system is to do its job of
allocating resources efficiently.

The price· increase inflicted by Bonzo on other banana

buyers and sellers is what economists call a pecuniary externality.

It is to be
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distinguished sharply from technological externalities, effects of one agent's actions on
the consumptions sets, utility functions or production functions of other agents for
which no appropriate price is charged.

In complete competitive markets, no adverse

efficiency consequences are associated with pecuniary externalities.
another word for general market interdependence.

They are merely

As is clear from the banana

example, the price changes will have distributional consequences.

If these are

undesirable, policy makers are free to do something about that with the most effective
redistribution instruments at their disposal4B.
Deficit financing has

two important distributional consequences.

First, by

borrowing instead of covering its expenditures with current taxes, the government
engages, holding all else constant, in intergenerational redistribution. 49

Second, the

reduction in total (private plus public) saving that results from the substitution of
borrowing for tax financing at given real interest rates, will put upward pressure on
real interest rates and also, in all likelihood, cause an appreciation of the real exchange
rate and an increase in the external terms of trade.

Thus, when a government finances

a deficit in the capital markets and interest rates rise, this is good news for creditors
everywhere and bad news for debtors everywhere 50 •
exporters and bad news for net importers.

It is also good news for net

If this form of redistribution is undesirable,

governments are free to respond appropriately.

It is extremely unlikely that the best

way to achieve the desired redistribution is by forbidding budget deficits or debts above
a certain level.

Note that it is also quite irrelevant whether the deficits under

consideration finance public consumption or productive public investment.
There are theoretical arguments, for the international coordination, on efficiency
grounds, of virtually every aspect of budgetary policy.

With very limited exceptions,

however, the need for coordination does not arise with respect to government deficit
and government debt.

When the economy has "pre-existing" distortions, or when the

instruments the government manipulates in the pursue of national advantage create
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inefficiencies or distortions, an efficiency-based case for fiscal coordination may exist.
Among the pre-existing distortions that may make policy transmission through market
prices inefficient are: distortionary taxes and transfers51; technological consumption or
production externalities; non-competitive behavior; incomplete markets; and Keynesian
market

failure reflecting insufficient or excessive effective demand (the practical

problems of productive international coordination are an important subject in their own
right, which cannot be addressed here).

However, even in these cases, the need for

fiscal policy coordination almost never requires limits to government deficits and debt.
For example, non-cooperative equilibria of a multi-country fiscal game in a Keynesian
model, which are Pareto-inefficient, might be characterized by either excessive or
insufficient government contributions to aggregate demand, depending on the nature of
the international spillovers and the relative weights put by the policy makers on
different objectives.
An argument can in principle be made for internationally agreed limits on public
borrowing when taxes are distortionary.

In this case, the increase in a nation's public

sector deficit has real external effects on other countries if their governments have
positive stocks of debt outstanding.

Higher world interest rates increase the foreign

governments' real interest bills, which have to be serviced by distortionary taxation
(Canzoneri and Diba [1991]).
International effective demand spillovers from government deficit financing when
labor and product markets are in non-Walrasian equilibrium and credit market
imperfections generate multiplier effects also blur the distinction between pecuniary and
technological externalities, but there is no general presumption that such spillovers
imply that deficits are excessive rather than insufficient.

The effective demand spillover

argument is of course not restricted to the case of deficit financing and would apply
equally to balanced-budget variations in public spending.
On balance, it seems fair to say that no convincing efficiency-based theoretical

48

case has been made for a supranational coordination mechanism such as the Maastricht
fiscal

norms.

There

already

international financial markets.

is

an

international

coordination

mechanism,

the

It is ironic that Brussels insists on encumbering with

international quantitativ e norms the one corner of budgetary policy where there exists
virtually no efficiency case for international coordination.

Conversely, the Treaty says

nothing about fiscal issues that do require international coordination or supranational
regulation such as the provision of local, regional, national and EC-wide public goods,
tax competition and fiscal federalism.
Is it perhaps appropriate to set norms cooperatively in Europe for

reasons of

intergenerational redistribution or for redistribution between creditors and debtors (or
between exporters and importers), when deficit financing changes intertemporal relative
prices (or static international relative prices)?

We are not aware that this has been

the subject of intergovernmental discussion at the EC level.
no consensus on these issues within national economies.

Indeed, there is little or

These distributional questions

are therefore quite different from the issue of solidarity between richer and poorer
regions in the EC that has found expression in the structural funds and the cohesion
fund.
Apart from the foregoing theoretical critiques of the externality arguments, it
appears that from an empirical point of view also too much attention has been given
to arguments suggesting a need for fiscal coordination on the basis of economic
externalities and international spillovers of non-cooperative fiscal policies.

We would

argue that the estimated size of these spillover effects is small enough and the
ambiguity about their sign large enough, to render it very unlikely that a systematic
bias towards excessive deficits might result from such externalities.
For what concerns the size of the international spillovers from fiscal policy in the
EC, the available evidence suggests that these are going to be small since the typical
European country (with an important exception for the case of Germany) is too small
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to affect world interest rates or economic activity in other European countries.

Both

the economic models used by the Community for fiscal policy simulation exercises (the
MULTIMOD model and the QUEST model) and other models (such as the variant of
the MSG model developed in Roubini [1991]) imply that under the ERM the output
and interest rate effects of a fiscal expansion are confined mostly to the originating EC
country and that the international spillover effects will be insignificant.

For example,

the MULTIMOD model used by the Commission to analyze the benefits and cost of
monetary union (see Commission of the European Communities [1990]) implies that,
under a full EMU monetary regime, the first year effect of an increase in government
expenditures in France equal to 1% of French GDP will be 0.80% of GDP in France
but insignificant in the other EC countries (--0.08 in Germany, --0.04% in Italy and
--0.05% in the U.K.).

While the French fiscal policy has a beggar-thy-neighbor effect

on the other EC countries' output, the size of the effect is so insignificant that it
should be of little concern to France's European partners.

Moreover, the simulation

results suggest that while the output effects might be marginally beggar-thy-neighbor,
the spillover of fiscal policy on foreign inflation is negative (i.e. a fiscal expansion
reduces inflation in the partner countries).

Similar results to those of France are

obtained for the other EC countries other than Germany.
Four further points should be made about international fiscal spillovers.

First, in

addition to being small, the spillover effects of fiscal policy are also uncertain: a
number of econometric and simulation models (such as those used in the comparative
Brookings study by Bryant et al.[1990]) suggest that even the sign of the spillover
effect is likely to be ambiguous.

Second, since the spillover may be positive or

negative depending on which variable and which model one considers, it is not possible
to determine a priori whether non~oope rative fiscal policies will lead to excessive fiscal
deficits rather than to excessive surpluses.

Third, the simulation exercises usually

imply that the original fiscal expansion is matched some time down the line by an
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increase in taxes that guarantees the solvency of the government.

Non-cooperative

fiscal policy in these exercises therefore cannot, by construction, lead to permanent
"excessive" fiscal deficits since the intertemporal budget constraint of the government
has to be satisfied in the long run.
Fourth, and most important, Germany is the only European country large enough
to cause significant international fiscal spillovers.

This is reinforced by its leadership

role in the ERM which. effectively requires it, unlike the other ERM members, to
sterilize international reserve flows.

In this regard, the econometric results derived in

model used by the Commission to analyze the benefits and costs of monetary union
(see Commission of the European Communities [1990]) need to be considered carefully.
Such simulations suggest that, under a fully cooperative and symmetric EMU monetary
regime, the first year effect of an increase in government expenditures in Germany
equal to 1% of German GDP will be 0.80% of GDP in Germany but essentially equal
to zero in France, Italy and the in the U.K.

Under the hypotheses of the model,

trade and interest rate linkages offset each other almost completely.
What

explains

these

results

is

that

a

fiscal

expansion

m

Germany

is

complemented with a significant monetary expansion by the Bundesbank and some
monetary contraction by the other ERM members, in order to maintain exchange rate
parities within the ERM.

In the more realistic case of an asymmetric EMS or EMU

where the burden of pegging the exchange rate is not carried by the leader country
(Germany) but rather by the followers (the other ERM members), a fiscal expansion in
Germany, unaccompanied by a German monetary expansion, would put pressure on the
nominal and real exchange rates, lead to an increase EC interest rates and force all the
other EMS countries to contract monetary policy in order to peg their ERM parities. s2
In this case, German fiscal expansion causes a recession in all other ERM countries.
According to the MULTIMOD model, a German fiscal expansion of 2% of GDP
could lead, in the first year, to a 1% increase in German GDP and a fall in French,
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Italian and British GDP equal to 0.25% of GDP.

Even stronger effects are found by

Roubini [1991], using a variant of the MSG simulation model:

in an asymmetric EMS,

a permanent German fiscal expansion equal to 1% of GDP reduces GDP in the other
ERM countries by over 1% of GDP in the first year; after five years, the other ERM
countries' output is still 0.5% below the baseline.

Similarly, in an asymmetric EMU, a

monetary contraction by the leader {Germany) forces the other ERM countries to
contract their money supplies in order to maintain their ERM parities.

This monetary

contraction, in turn, leads to a transitory output fall in all ERM countries.

In the

simulations by Roubini [1991], a permanent German monetary contraction equal to 1%
reduces GDP in the other ERM countries by an average of 0.8% of GDP in the first
year as they contract their money supplies to peg their parities with the Deutsche
Mark; this output contraction is transitory and disappears after about seven years.
Since the recent German macroeconomic policy mix has been characterized by a
significant fiscal expansion accompanied by a monetary contraction aimed at preventing
excessive inflation, the ensuing rise in nominal and real interest rates put significant
pressure on the ERM exchange rates.

Given the asymmetric nature of the present

ERM regime, where the leader has not been willing to loosen its monetary policy in
order to take the pressure off the ERM parities, the German policy mix has inflicted
serious output and unemployment costs on all ERM members.
However, for ERM countries other than Germany, the evidence suggests that
externalities due to non-cooperative fiscal policy cannot explain why there should be a
systematic bias towards

"excessive" deficits nor why the Community should be

concerned about these "externalities".
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ID.6. A BIAS TOWARDS "EXCESSIVE" DEFICITS WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL
EXTERNALITIES?

ID.6.1. Politically motivated fiscal deficits.

Explanations of "excessive" deficits based on international economic externalities
(whether efficiency-related or distributional) are unsatisfactory.

It then follows that; if

a structural bias towards "excessive deficits" exists, there must be some political
distortion that leads some governments, even in a closed economy, to follow systematic

policies of fiscal deficits in excess of what can be considered economically optimal .
One could then attempt to rationalize the EC rules for fiscal constraint with the idea
that discretionary fiscal policy leads to politically motivated "excessive" deficits.
In the absence of significant international spillovers, however, such politically
motivated excessive national government

deficits

would

not

require international

coordination through a centrally determined, monitored and enforced set of uniform
fiscal norms.

Each nation could separately legislate and enact nation-specific rules

restricting its government's ability to borrow.

Only if, despite the absence of

significant international externalities, a foreign or supranational agency is able to impose
and enforce rules that the individual nation cannot impose on itself, would there be a
case for Maastricht-like fiscal rules.

Even then, one would not expect to find that the

rule specifies the same two numbers for all member states.
In general, the empirical evidence is consistent with the view that such a bias
towards deficits exists in a number of countries.

For example, the formal tests

discussed in Section II of this paper show that the path of fiscal policy followed by a
few EC countries might not be consistent with long term solvency of their public
sector.

Similarly, the existence of large primary gaps in a number of countries suggests

that a change in the present path of fiscal policies will be required to avoid persistent
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(and eventually unsustainable) increases in debt ratios. 53
What can therefore explain excessive deficits?

A class of recent explanations

elaborates the idea of "political" distortions that lead governments to adopt systema
tic
policies of excessive fiscal deficits. There are at least four classes of political models
of
fiscal deficits: 1. The public choice approach of Buchanan; 2. Models of governm
ent
weakness and decentralized government; 3. Models of strategic public debt choice;
4.
Political business cycle models. 54
The empirical evidence on these political models of deficits is growing and not
discouraging. Roubini and Sachs [1989a, 1989b), using panel data on a sample
of 15
OECD countries, find that political instability (as proxied by variables such as the
type
of government (single party majority, presidential, presidential with divided governm
ent,
multi-p arty coalition, minority) or low average duration of the government lead
to
higher inflation-adjusted budget deficits. Roubini [1991] and Cukierman, Edwards
and
Tabellini (1991] find similar evidence that high government turnover is associated
with
deficits in developing countries.

More recently, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini [1991]

have found similar evidence showing the effects of weak government and short coalitio
n
duration on fiscal deficits in the industrial countries. Expanding on the evidenc
e in
Sachs and Roubini, Alesina, Cohen and Roubini [1992] find that both politica
l
instability and electoral factors (such as those stressed by the political business
cycle
models) explain fiscal deficits. Alesina, Cohen and Roubini [1993] find some evidenc
e
that, in addition to the aforementioned variables, the partisan nature of a governm
ent
matters for inflation-corrected fiscal deficits: in particular, left-wing governments
tend
to run larger fiscal deficits than right-wing ones. Similar evidence by Alogoskoufis
and
Philippopoulos [1991] for partisan effects on inflation rates in Greece might help explain
the high level of nominal fiscal deficits in that country.55
In summary, the evidence supports the idea that political factors play a role in
explaining biases towards budget deficits. Specifically, the political instability and
the
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government weakness that prevail in Italy are important factors in explaining the fiscal
stalemate in that country and its inability to adjust its fiscal balances.

Similarly,

partisan bias and conflict and a high degree of political polarization appear to be
important factors in the large fiscal deficits of Greece.

However, the argument

regarding the role of government instability and weakness also works the other way
around.

In particular, the drastic fiscal adjustment in the early 1980s in countries such

as Belgium, Ireland and Denmark began after elections (in 1982) that led to a new and
stable political majority.

Similarly, the improvement in the fiscal conditions of

countries such as Spain and Portugal has occurred under the rule of stable one-party
majorities (socialist in Spain, conservative in Portugal).

ill.6.2. An argument in favor of the external enforcement of rules of fiscal discipline.
The existence of political factors making for a tendency towards excessive deficits
may seem to provide support for fiscal rules such as those agreed to in Maastricht.
When one considers the experience of the ERM, it seems quite clear that the existence
of the exchange rate constraint did affect the political and social debate in the early
1980s in countries such as Italy and France and strengthened the bargaining position of
political and economic groups favoring anti-inflat ionary policies.

In Italy, the drive

towards a reduction in wage indexation (recently completed successfully) appears to
have been helped by the ERM constraint.

In France, after the go-alone socialist

expansionary policies of the 1981-83, the contractionary fiscal and monetary policies
followed after 1983 were sold to the French public as the only ones that would allow
France to remain in the ERM and in Europe.
In a similar way, the Maastrich t fiscal constraints might be expected to affect the
political game regarding the need for fiscal austerity in countries such as Italy and
Greece.

With the penalty for failure to meet the fiscal criteria of eventual exclusion

from monetary union looming over the political horizon in Italy, the Maastrich t stick
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(rigid fiscal

rules)

and carrot (participation in the monetary union) will figure

prominently in the political debate over fiscal adjustment in that country.

The same

stick and carrot are likely to affect the political debate and the fiscal policies adopted
in other EC countries that are presently following policies of excessive deficits.
Even if the ERM rules did have the effects attributed to them here and even if
the Maastricht rules will do so in the future, the necessity of these rules for these
outcomes has not been demonstrated.

One could argue that, while political uncertainty

and instability in the domestic polity may be a source of a systematic bias towards
budget deficits, reputational forces might be enough to support cooperative rules
conducive to fiscal discipline in a democratic institutional framework where different
governments and parties alternate in power.

Even if an "external" mechanism were to

be necessary to support co-operative behavior among the domestic players, the word
"external" in game theory refers to an arrangement, institution or agent outside the
original set of players.
supranational.

It does not need to be "external" in the sense of foreign or

Domestic constitutional arrangements are an example.

It is therefore

not obvious that an external enforcement mechanism such as the Maastricht guidelines
supported by EC sanctions is necessary to enforce national fiscal discipline 56 .
Consider, for the sake of argument, the case where a cooperatively agreed upon
national budget rule has the following conservative features: over the course of a
normal business cycle, the inflation-and real output growth-corrected5 7 current budget of
the general government must be balanced or in surplus 58 .

Inflation-and real output

growth-corrected, structural (or cyclically adjusted) current fiscal deficits (surpluses) will
be run during recessions (cyclical expansions) and periods of transitorily high (low)
government spending.

Such a rule would keep the expected net public debt-GDP ratio

from rising over business cycle length time intervals5 9•

While inevitably arbitrary, such

a rule would be less objectionable than the Maastricht rules.

Game theory suggests

that, in some circumstances, reputational forces might be enough to sustain cooperative
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behavior: if discount rates are not too high, if the benefits from cooperation are large
and the short term benefits from cheating small and if the true state of the economy
can be ascertained easily, a cooperative agreement could be sustainable as a political
equilibrium without the need for an external agent to enforce it.
In reality the presence of systematic and unavoidable uncertainty is likely
seriously to weaken these reputational forces60:
1. Output shocks might be observed with delay and measurement errors.

2. There might be legitimate disagreements about the transitory or permanent
nature of output and spending disturbances.
3. The distinction between current and capital expenditure is not clear-cut.
4. There are many implicit, intangible and often contingent future liabilities of the
public sector (as in the case of the liabilities of the social security system) that will
give rise to uncertain future spending flows that need bear no relation to the current
values of these flows, or even to their average values over the cycle.
5. As the U.S. experience with Gramm-Rudman targets shows, rigid fiscal targets
can be circumvented by putting off-budget certain spending items (see for example the
S&L bail-out and the FDIC refinancing).

An external arbitrator and settlement

enforcer is required in case of irresolvable disagreement.
6.

Any real-world rule, even a contingent one, can be no more than an

incomplete contract that cannot cover the myriads of contingencies that might occur in
reality.
In the presence of such pervasive uncertainty, the reputational mechanisms
supporting fiscal discipline are likely to break down and institutions become necessary
to monitor agreements, interpret rules, adjudicate controversies, and enforce the agreed
rules through sanctions against deviant agents.

Where such a deus ex machina can be

found is, unfortunately, not part of the theory. 61
Under these circumstances, the EC (or one of its organs such as the Commission)
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can play the enforcement role, providing external surveillance and monitoring of the
fiscal balances of the member countries.
domestic incentives for fiscal discipline.

The constant monitoring can strengthen the
However, such surveillance would be toothless

without the presence of explicit sanctions aimed at punishing deviant countries.

In the

period leading up to monetary union, the sanction of exclusion from such a union
appears a stronger incentive to follow disciplined fiscal policies that the rather tepid
sanctions once EMU is a fact.

IV.

CONCLUSION:

HOW

TO

LIVE

WITH

THE

FISCAL

CONVERGENCE

CONDITIONS OF MAASTRICHT.

It may be that the whole issue of EMU will be made moot by a widespread
collapse of political support for it.

The turmoil in the foreign exchange markets during

the week leading up to the narrow "yes" vote in the French referendum on Maastricht
has created doubts as to the likelihood, feasibility and desirability of monetary union.
There is growing awareness that the 12 EC members are still characterized by
persistent, even if reduced, divergences in macroeconomic policies and policy objectives
and that they continue to be buffeted by asymmetric disturbances.
The United Kingdom, faced with a choice between maintaining a seriously
overvalued currency at the cost of record high real interest rates and a persistent
recession or suspending its membership in the ERM and pursuing its own monetary and
interest rate policy, has for now opted for the second road.

Alone among the major

EC countries, EMU continues to receive widespread political support in Italy.

In

Germany, the support for the Maastricht Treaty by the Kohl government appears to
clash with the subtle and not-so-subtle attempts by the Bundesbank to undermine it.
The decision of the Bundesbank effectively to maintain its tight monetary policy even
when confronted with the currency crisis that this policy stance contributed to, confirms
that the only form of European monetary union acceptable to the German central bank
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is one where the objective of German price stability overrides all other policy
objectives.
A plausible, if Machiavellian, interpretation of the advocacy by the Bundesbank of
the infeasible debt norms of Maastricht is that these are expected and intended to
delay EMU, and especially the move to a common currency, until well into the next
century and perhaps to prevent it from taking place altogether.

One motivating factor

could be the first universal law of organizational behavior, according to which no
organization ever cooperates enthusiastically and wholeheartedly with a venture that, if
successful,

will result in its demise62.

This of course applies to all national central

banks that would lose their formal autonomy under EMU.

In addition, German

monetary officials must realize that they will never be as influential in the ESCB and
the ECB following EMU and the adoption of a common currency, as they are today
under the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS with the D-Mark.

By contrast,

French and Italian monetary officials can anticipate an increase in their influence
following EMU, after many frustrating years of subordination to the Bundesbank in the
EMR.

The same sentiments may also explain in part the official French and Italian

eagerness to have the Maastricht Treaty ratified and the monetary union process
continued successfully.
The Italian enthusiasm for EMU, however,

clashes with the objective fact that

this country is very far from satisfying the minimal economic conditions required for
joining a monetary union and staying in it.

Italy's fiscal deficit is out of control: its

debt to GDP ratio exceeds 100%; when it left the ERM last September, its real
exchange rate was seriously overvalued by five years of fixed nominal rates despite
positive inflation differentials vis a vis the rest of the EMR countries; its political
system appears paralyzed.

The crisis of the Lira in the week before the French

referendum has at least had the positive effect of shaking any remaining misplaced
self-confidence, optimism and policy inertia that five years of exchange rate stability
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may have created.

Whether the shock waves set off by the devaluation of the Lira

and the suspension of Italy's ERM membership will break the political stalemate and
lead to a serious fiscal adjustment remains, however, an open issue.

If the Maastricht Treaty is eventually ratified and EMU remains alive, the EC
member states are faced with a number of options. If by the end of 1996 at least 6
countries are judged to have satisfied the membership criteria, these six would,
presumably, become the nucleus of the monetary union. If by the end of 1997 the
date for the beginning of the third stage (full monetary union) has not been set, the
third stage will start on 1 January 1999, with the list of qualifiers established no later
than 1 July 1998.

After January 1, 1999, non-member states will join as soon as they

are judged to meet the criteria.

The United Kingdom alone can choose to meet the

criteria without becoming a full member.
Clearly, the fiscal criteria, and especially the debt criterion, will be one of the
sticking points.

If both the deficit and the debt reference values are interpreted

strictly, Greece, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and even the Netherlands will not be able to
join the monetary union by the end of 1996. The Netherlands might meet the debt
criterion by the end of 1998 with a significant (at least 2.5% of GDP) increase in the
primary surplus from the 1991 level of 2% of GDP.

Greece, Italy, Belgium and

Ireland are unlikely to satisfy the debt reference value until well into the next decade.
Assuming that full economic and monetary union remains the objective, how
should the fiscal criteria be applied in the evaluation of potential members' fitness to
join?
We have argued in this paper that the fiscal convergence criteria designed to
eliminate or prevent "excessive deficits" are badly motivated and poorly designed and
apt to lead to unnecessary hardship if pursued mechanically.
especially likely to cause avoidable pain.

The debt criterion is

There is no case for restricting the debt-GD P

ratio to lie below any particular numerical value, and a-fortior i no case for a common

I·

1--
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numerical limit for 12 heterogeneous countries.
Given the inherited debt-G DP ratio, the achievement of government solvency
clearly puts a lower bound on the long-run average value of the primary surplus-GDP
ratio.

It is also evident, that it does not . constitute a credible policy to justify
persistent primary deficits which would be inconsistent with solvency if maintai
ned

indefinitely, with the promise of large compensatory primary surpluses at
some
unspecified time in the distant future.
Given an inflation target, a lower bound on the long-run average primary
surplus-GDP ratio implies an upper bound on the long-run average interest-inclusi
ve
deficit-GDP ratio.

Such an upper bound is of course consistent with cyclical variations

in the deficit and with temporary increases in the deficit above the upper limit on
its
long-ru n average value reflecting transitory (but not necessarily cyclical) spendin
g
increases or reductions in the revenue base.
The "golden rule" of government financing is based on two fallacies.
that consumption loans to the public sector are intrinsically undesirable.

The first is
The second is

that government investment does · not, in the long run, constitute a drain on
the
government budget because, directly or indirectly, it generates higher future primary
surpluses equal in present discounted value to the investment outlays.

However, the

returns on sector investment projects (even socially desirable ones) need not accrue
in
the form of cash returns that are appropriated by the government.
There is no
substitu te for the careful consideration of the current and future cash flow implica
tions
of public sector investment projects.
Since the achievement of neither fiscal target is necessary in order to satisfy the
inflation, interest rate and exchange rate convergence criteria for EMU, one is left
to
wonder about the political reasons for their inclusion in the Treaty and its protoco
ls.
The Bundesbank was, after all, not a signatory to the Treaty.

Could it be true that

"They reflect not economic logic, but a mixture of German horror at the Italian
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national debt, and Dutch Puritanism (always the most extreme in my experience) - a
grim combination." as Anthony Harris [1992] argued recently?
Of the two numerical targets, the 60% debt-GDP ratio will have to be ignored
(or interpreted so loosely that it amounts to the same thing) if massive unnecessary
fiscal deflations in Italy, Greece, Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands are to be
avoided.

Pursuing the 3% deficit-GDP ratio in a gradualist manner will be painful

only for Italy and Greece, moderately painful for Belgium and Portugal and relatively
painless for the rest.
The adoption and centralized enforcement of the deficit norm may be potentially
helpful for a country like Italy whose government appears, for reasons that are not well
understood, to receive from international agreements a transplant of fiscal backbone
that it cannot obtain through domestic political commitments.

In a similar manner,

Portugal currently appears to achieve an injection of anti-inflationary discipline from
membership in the ERM, the way France did in the eighties.
Both fiscal norms appear largely irrelevant for France, Germany, the UK and
Luxembourg, countries that already satisfy them or will be able to meet them without
excessive effort.

They also appear irrelevant for Greece but for the opposite reason.

Greece has not yet shown a sign of durable fiscal rectitude, regardless of international
or domestic commitments.
Countries like Belgium, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands, where appropriate
fiscal retrenchment has been under way for some time, should be allowed to ignore the
debt norm and pursue the deficit norm in a gradualist manner.
As regards the transitional output and unemployment cost of a concerted attempt
by the eleven (until September 1992, now nine) ERM members to meet the deficit
criterion by end-1996 or end-1998, a lot will depend on the . stance of EC-wide
monetary policy (effectively controlled by the Bundesbank when all major countries
participate in the ERM).

The current high nominal and real interest rates in Europe
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are driven by two factors: first, high real rates reflecting European savings-investment
imbalances caused by the transformations in Eastern Europe and the German deficit
financing of the East German economy reconstruction; second, a very restrictive
monetary stance of the Bundesbank driven by its concern about the increase in German
inflation associated with the East German reconstruction and consumption boom.

This

German policy mix has significantly increased the real interest burden of the public
debt in the EC, especially in countries with high debt-GDP ratios such as Italy,
Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands.

It has also deepened the recession in the

non-German ERM member countries and contributed to cyclical increases in their
public sector deficits.
The reconstruction and consumption boom associated with German unification
implied the need for an appreciation of the German real exchange rate.

This would

probably have been true to some extent even if the spending increase had been
tax-financed.

Deficit financing reinforces the effect.

The required real appreciation can

in principle be accomplished either through a nominal revaluation of the D-Mark (or,
equivalently, through a nominal devaluation of the other ERM currencies) or through a
temporary excess of the German inflation rate over the inflation rates of the other
ERM countries.

When the Bundesbank refused to accept the inflation option, the need

for an eventual ERM realignment became inescapable.

The timing was of course

influenced by the "exogenous" shock of the French referendum.
The inflexibility of the Bundesbank also gives cause for future concern, should
Maastricht get back on track.

For a given level of real output, a decrease in real and

nominal interest rates resulting from the fiscal contraction required by Maastricht
increases the demand for real money balances.

In the absence of empirically

implausible degrees of general price level flexibility, a recession is unavoidable unless
the Bundesbank accommodates with a one-off increase in the nominal money stock the
lower interest rates associated with the fiscal contraction and the disappearance of
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exchange rate realignment risk.

An institution with the conservative monetary

reputation of the Bundesbank is ideally placed to engineer a recession-preventing
once-and-for -all increase in the level of the nominal money stock without this fueling
private sector fears of inflationary
the nominal money stock.

sustained future increases in the rate of growth of

Given the past, inward-looking and inflexible record of the

Bundesbank, however, it is doubtful that their ability to act is matched by wisdom to
act.
What are the options for a nation that does not meet the convergence criteria by
the end of 1998?
are met.

The first is to keep on trying until the conditions for membership

This would presumably involve adopting a unilaterally fixed exchange rate

regime vis a vis the ECU, the common currency of the full members of EM;U.

If the

full members perceive a good-faith effort by the candidate member, the latter's fixed
exchange rate with the ECU could even be managed cooperatively.
The second option for a country that fails (or expects to fail) to meet the
Maastricht criteria by the end of 1998 is to "go it alone" and manage its exchange
rate so as to best serve its perception of its national interest, without any further
attempt to satisfy the criteria for full membership.

This could of course be the option

chosen by (or forced upon) all current ERM members if the Treaty is not delivered
from its current state of limbo.
What would be the economic consequences of a failure to move to a common
currency?

Compared with a system of credibly fixed exchange rates between national

currencies, the benefits from a common currency are small.

These benefits would

consist in the saving of transaction costs associated with the replacement of several
national currencies by the ECU, and in the opportunity for competing somewhat more
effectively with the Yen and the US dollar as international reserve and vehicle
currencies.

For individual member states the distribution of the internal and external

seigniorage of the ESCB-ECB is also important.

The costs and benefits of the
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non-monetar y aspects of economic union (the single market, economic aspects of the
protocol on social policy) are independent of the success or failure of monetary union.
However, the main benefits of a monetary union possibly consist in the discontinuous
gain in credibility for countries subject to an inflation bias.

One should therefore not

compare a monetary union with a system of credibly fixed exchange rates but rather
with a system of partially credible fixed rates with a realignment option.
The costs of a common currency are non-negligible.

These consist mainly in the

costs of any system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates in comparison with a fixed
exchange rate regime that allows for realignments or with a floating rate system.

The

larger and less open member states lose a mechanism that enables them to achieve
·necessary changes in international relative prices and costs more rapidly and with lower
costs than would be possible through variations in relative national nominal costs and
prices.

No-one has convincingly demonstrated that the eleven ERM members (or even

the nine) form an "optimal currency area"; if anything, recent empirical work by
Eichengreen [1991] and Eichengreen and Bayoumi [1992] and Von Hagen and Neumann
[1992] suggests the opposite.
In addition, each member state, large or small, loses the opportunity of pursuing
an optimal nationally differentiated inflation policy.

Since the EC members differ

greatly in their ability to levy non-inflation taxes, this restriction on the national fiscal
policy arsenals could be of some relevance for a few countries.
With a common currency, national exchange rate adjustments and nationally
differentiated monetary policy disappear from the stabilization arsenal.

The importance

of flexibility in the use of the remaining national stabilization instrument, national
fiscal policy, is correspondingly enhanced.

Debt and deficit ceilings impair that

flexibility and with it each member state's ability to respond to nationally differentiated
shocks.
There are non-economic arguments for EMU.

The move to a common currency
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is an important step in the European federalist agenda, and one might be in favor of it
because it represents a strengthening of supranational European institutions.
however, raises the important issue of sequencing.

This,

Historically, no political entity

whose degree of political integration was not at least that of a confederation, has
succeeded in maintaining a common currency.6 3 The level of political integration in the
EC still falls well short of that of a confederation, let alone that of a federation.

It

may not be wise to attempt monetary union again before further political integration
has taken place.
The economic case for EMU is by no means overwhelming.

If there are no

sizable political gains to be set against the economic price of transitional fiscal deflation
and

permanently

reduced

fiscal

flexibility,

the

cost

of

the

alternative

to

EMU-con tinued national monetary autonomy for those who want it and continuing the
current ERM-DM zone for the rest-may not seem unbearable.
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Table I 1.1

General Goverrment Net Lending (as a share of GDP)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Belgillll
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
United Kingdom

Belgillll
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
United Kingdom

Belgillll

Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
United Kingdom

61-70
-1.5
1.3
0.4
NA
NA
0.4
-3.6
-2.3
1.8
-0.8
NA
-0.6

71-80
-5.1
0.9
-1.9
NA
-0.6
-0.5
-8.4
-7.6
2.6
-1.9
NA
-3

1977
-5.6
-0.5
-2.3
NA
-0.6
-0.8
-7.6
-7
3.3
-1.8
NA
-3.2

81-90
-8.8
-2.5
-1.9
-12.9
-4.6
-2.3
-9.3
-11.2
2.3
-5.8
-7.9
-1. 7

1978
-6.1
-0.3
-2.4
NA
-1. 7
-2.1
-9.7
-8.5
5
-2.8
NA
-4.4

1970
-2.2
4.1
0.4
NA
0.7
0.9
-4.3
-3.3
3.2
-1.2
NA
3

1971
-3.2
3.9
0
NA
-0.5
0.6
-4.2
-4.8
2.6
-1
NA
1.3

1972
-3.7
3.9
-0.4
NA
0.3
0.6
-4. 1
-7
2.3
-0.4
NA
-1.3

1973
-3.3
5.2
1.3
NA
1.1
0.6
-4.6
-6.5
3.8
0.8
NA
-2.7

1979
-7.3
-1. 7
-2.5
NA
-1.6
-0.8
-11.4
-8.3
0.7
-3.7
NA
-3.3

1980
-9.2
-3.3
-2.8
NA
-2.6
0
-12.7
-8.6
-0.4
-4
NA
-3.4

1981
-12.8
-6.9
-3.6
-11
-3.9
-1.9
-13.4
-11.4
-3.5
-5.5
-9.3
-2.6

1982
-11. 1
-9.1
-3.3
-7.7
-5.6
-2.8
-13.8
-11.3
-1
-7.1
-10.4
-2.5

1990
-5.7
-1.5
-1.9
-20.4
-4
-1. 7
-3.6
-10.7
4.7
-5.3
-5.8
-0.7

1991
-6.2
-2.0
-3. 1
-16.5
-4.4
-1. 7
-2.3
-10.2
2.5
-3.9
-6.4
-2.0

1992
-5.9
-2.1
-3.4
-13.2
-4.3
-2.0
-2.5
-9.9
2.6
-4.0
-5.4
-4.9

1987

1988

1989

-7. i

-6.9

-6.7

2.4
-1.8
-12.2
-3.2
-1.9
-9.1
-11
1.6
-6.6
-6.8
-1.3

0.5
-2.1
-14.4
-3.3
-1.8
-5.2
-10.9
2.4
-5.2
-5.4
1. 1

-0.5
0.2
-18.3
-2.7
-1.2
-3.5
-10.1
4.3
-5.2
-3.4
1.3

1974
-2.7
3.1
-1.2
NA
0.2
0.3
-8.2
-6.4
5.3
-0.2
NA
-3.8

1983
-11. 5
-7.2
-2.5
-8.3
-4.8
-3.2
-11.8
-10.6
2
-6.4
-9
-3.3

1975
-4.8
-1.4
-5.5
NA
0
-2.4
-12.5
-10.6
1.1
-2.9
NA
-4.5

1984
-9
-4 .1
-1.9
-10
-5.4
-2.8
-9.8
-11.6
3.4
-6.3
-12
-4

1976
-5.6
-0.2
-3.3
NA
-0.3
-0.7
-8.6
-8.1
2
-2.6
NA
-4.9

1985
-8.5
-2
-0.9
-13.8
-6.9
-2.9
-11 .2
-12.5
5.3
-4.8
-10. 1
-2.8

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Source: European Economy, Conmission of the European Economies
and European Economy Supplement A, Conmission of the European Economies
Note: 1992 figures are forecasts.
The Germany figures refer to West Germany only.

1986
-9.1
3.4
-1.3
-12.6
-6
-2.7
-11 .2
-11. 7
3.5
-6
-7.2
-2.4
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Table 11.2

Gross Public Debt

(as a share of GDP)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Belgiun
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
United Kingdom

1970
68.5
14.8
18.4
21.3
15.3
27.6
62.1
44.8
28. 1
52.2
NA
80

1971
66.6
12.8
18.4
21.9
15.8
26.5
61.5
50.5
28.2
49.8
NA
81.8

1972
66.4
11.2
18.8
23.2
14.4
24
57.8
56.5
25.1
46.7
NA
72

1973
64.2
8.8

18.6
19.5
12.6
22.4
54.7
58
20.4
43.4
17.6
66.2

1974
59.8

6
19.6
25.6
12.1
21.9
59.7
55.6
16.6
41.4
17.3
61.7

1975
60.5
6.8
25.1
22.4
12.5
24.1
65.9
63.8
18. 1
41.4
25.5
61.1

1976
60
11.2
29.1
22.1
13.1
22.9
70.7
58.6
16.4
40.2
31.4
58.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Belgiun
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
United Kingdom

1977
63.9
15.5
28.5
22.4
14.2
22.7
67.5
57.8
16.6
39.7
33.2
64.3

1978
68
23.6
30
29.4
14
23.2
69.6
62.4
15.4
40.9
36.3
57.1

1979
71.4
29
30.8
29
16.1
24.2
75.2
61.6
14.2
42.7
41
55.1

1980
76.9
39.3
32.7
28.8
17.9
24.6
76.8
59
13.8
45.9
37.1
54.1

1981
89.4
52
36.3
34.2
23.2
23.9
81.7
61.1
14.4
50.3
46.6
53.3

1982
97.5
64.5
39.3
36.1
28.7
27.9
87.2
66.4
14.5
55.6
50.1
58.1

1983
107.4
74.3
40.9
41.2
35.1
29.5
97.3
72
14.8
62
56
57.7

1984
112.6
79.8
41.6
53.2
39.9
43.8
104.8
75 .1
15
66.1
62.4
60.3

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Belgiun
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
United Kingdom

1985
119.8
76.8
42.3
62.6

45.2
45.5
108.5
82
14
69.7
70.9
58.9

1986
124
69
42.4
65.2
46.2
45.7
120.8
86.5
13.5
71.6
69.5
57.7

1987
131
65.8
43.5
72.9
46.6
47.3
122
90.9
11.8
75.4
72.9
55.7

1988
132.4
66.1
44.1
80.4
42.9
47.2
120.4
93.3
9.9
77.7
75.2
50.3

1989
128.4
65.6
43
85.8
44.2
47.4
110.1
96
8.5
77.9
72
45.1

1990
127.3
66.4
43.6
93.7
44.5
46.6
103
98.6
7.3
78.3
68.2
42.8

1991
129.4
66.7
46.2
96.4
45.6
47.2
102.8
101.2
6.9
78.4
64.7
43.8

1992
129.6
65.8
48.7
99
46.4
47.5
100.4
103.9
6.4
79.5
62.7
45.6

---------·-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Source: European Economy, Comnission of the European Economies.
Note: 1992 figures are forecasts.
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Table I1.3

General Government Primary Balance (as a share of GDP)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------Belgiun

Derrnark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
.United Kingdom
EC 12

74-81
-1.9
1.2
-1.3
NA
-0.7
0.3
-4.9
-3.9
2.6
0.4
NA
0.7
-0.9

1982
-1.8
-3. 1
-0.5
-5 .1
-4.6
-0.8
-4.8
-4.2
0
-1.9
-4.9
2.5
·1.4

1983
-2
0.9
0.5
-4.6
-3.5
-0.6
-2.5
-3. 1
3.1
-0.7
-2.6
1.4
-0.9

1984
1
5.5
1. 1
-5.4
-3.3
-0.1
-0.4
-3.6
4.5
-0.3
-4.9
0.9
-0.6

1985
2.3
7.9
2.1
-8.5
-3.6

0
-0.9
-4.5
6.4
1.5
-2.2
2. 1
-0.2

1986
2.3
12.2
1. 7
-6.8
-2
0.2
-1.5
-3.2
4.6
0.2
2
2.1
0.2

---------------------------------------------------------------------------Belgiun
Derrnark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
United Kingdom
EC 12

1987
3.6
10.7
1.1
-5
0.3
0.9
0.6
-3
2.7
-0.5

,

3
0.6

1988
3.4
8.4
0.7
-6.5
0
4.2
-2.7
3.4
0.9
2.4
5

1989
3.9
6.9
2.9
-10. 1
0.7
1.6
5.6
-1. 1
5. 1
0.7
3.7
5
1.9

1990
5.2
5.7
0.7
-8.4
-0.5
1.4
4.8
-1
5.4
0.6
2.4
2.6
0.9

1991
4.7
5.li
-0.S
-3.3
0.2
1.;·
6.0

o.a
3.2
2.0
2.,
1.2
0.2

1992
5.4
5.2
-0.6
-0.5
-0.5
1.3
5.8
0.7
3.,
2.2
3.0
-1.6
0.4

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

·source: European Economy, Conmission of the European Economies.
Note: 1992 figures are forecasts.
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TABLE Il.4
One-Period Primary Gaps For 1992
Real

GAP 1

frowth rate

(%)

(% GDP)

(% GDP)

(% GDP)

2.2
2.3
2.0
2.0
2.1
3.0
1.2
2.3
1.3
3.1
1.7
3.4

1.9
4.4
5.7
3.1
5.4
9.8
1.6
5.1
5.4
3.2
3.0
4.1

46.2
47.2
101.2
43.8
129.4
66.7
96.4
102.8
78.4
45.6
64.7
6.9

-0.1
1.0
3.7
0.5
4.2
3.9
0.3
2.8
3.2
0.0
0.8
0.0

0.5
-0.3
3.0
2.1
-1.2
-1.3
0.8
-3.0
1.0
0.5
-2.2
-3.1

%)

Germany
France ·
Italy
UK
Belgium
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
Spain
Portugal
Luxembourg

Public debt s1*

Real
interest rate

s*1

is the one period ahead debt-GDP ratio stabilizing primary surplus-GDP ratio;
GAP 1 denotes the corresponding primary gap. Source: EC data and forecasts.

TABLE Il.5
Myopic Permanent Primary Gaps For 1992
Growth
rate
~ lO)

Public
debt
In-I
l 7o uLJY J

l io GDP)

3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0

5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0

46.2
47.2
101.2
43.8
129.4
66.7
96.4
102.8
78.4
45.6
64.7
6.9

0.9
0.9
1.9
0.8
2.5
1.3
1.9
2.0
1.5
0.9
1.2
0.1

f (tf \

Germany
France
Italy
UK
Belgium
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
Spain
Portugal
Luxembourg

*
soo

Real interest
rate
fM\
l 7oJ

r,c,-...,...__\

,,,_,

MGAPCD

(% GDP)
1.5
-0.4
1.2
2.4
-2.9
-3.9
2.4
-3.8

-0.7
1.4
-1.8
-3.0

*
Sui is the constant primary surplus-GDP ratio required for long-run solvency;
U)

GAP

denotes the corresponding primary gap.

Source: EC data and forecasts.
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Tablell .6
Differences between forecasts of primary surpluses for 1992 by EC and OECD
s9iEC)-s 92 (OECD)
(% of GDP)
Germany
France
Italy
UK
Belgium
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
Spain
Portuga l
Luxembourg
*

0.7
1.0
1.6
1.3

0.8
4.1 *

0.6
0.7
·0.7
1.1

NA
NA

The difference between the EC and OECD forecasts of the primary balance in
Denmark depends largely on whether interest receipts and royalties are
considered as current revenues (as in the EC data) or as negative interest
payments (as in the OECD data).
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TABLE 11.7
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE DEBT WHEN THE DEFICIT TARGET IS MET?
Scenarios:
debt
91
(%)

(a)
¢91
(%)

(b)

(c)

(d)

def91
(%)

debt
(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

96

debt

98

debt

96

debt

GE 46.2
F
47.2
It
101.2
UK 43.8
B
129.4
DK 66.7
GR 96.4
IR 102.8
NL 78.4
s 45.6
p
64.7
L
6.9

7.8
4.3
8.8
4.6
4.7
4.0
21.3
5.1
5.4
9.5
16.1
4.7

2.9
1.7
10.2
2.0
6.2
2.0
16.5
2.3
3.9
4.4
6.4
-2.5

47.6
46.1
97.1
44.1
121.3
64.1
88.6
90.9
76.1
52.9
61.2
-5.9

47.9
45.7
96.1
44.3
119.0
63.2
86.3
86.8
75.4
55.1
60.0
10.3

49.8
50.6
92.9
48.0
115.0
65.9
89.2
94.2
75.1
49.4
64.3
19.0

51.1
51.8
90.2
49.4
110.2
65.6
86.7
91.3
73.9
50.6
64.2
23.1

EC

6.9

4.3

60.9

60.8

61.8

61.9

61.5

98

Scenario (a). 1/J: starting from the 1991 value for nominal GDP growth, if 7/J
exceeds 5%, it declines at a constant exponential rate and reaches 5% by
the end of 1996. It stays constant at its 1991 value otherwise.
def: if the 1991 value of the deficit-GD P ratio exceeds 3%, def declines
at a constant exponential rate and reaches 3% by the end of 1996. It
stays constant at its 1991 value otherwise. The debt-GDP ratio at the end
of 1996 is calculated.
Scenario (b). Same as (a) but taking 1998 rather than 1996 as the final year.
Scenario (c). 7/J: if 7/J exceeds 5% in 1991, this value is reached immediate ly
in 1992 and maintained every year thereafter. It stays constant at its
1991 level otherwise.
def: if def exceeds 3% in 1991, this value is reached immediate ly in 1992
and maintaine d thereafter. It stays constant at its 1991 level otherwise.
Scenario (d). Same as (c) but taking 1998 rather than 1996 as the final year.

77
TABLE II.8
lffl!T CONSTANT DEFICIT~DP RATIO TO GET TO THE DEBT TARGET?

def91

It
B
DK

GR
IR
NL
p

The constant deficit-GDP ratio that would
reduce the debt-GDP ratio to 60% under
scenarios:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

101.2
129.4
66.7
96.4
102.8
78.4
64.7

8.8
4.7
4.0
21.3
5.1
5.4
16.1

10.2
6.2
2.0
16.5
2.3
3.9
6.4

-3.2
-9.2
1.5
-0.2
-4.5
-0.2
1.5

-0.9
-5.4
1.8
1.9
-2.1
0.8
1.8

-4.2
-9.1
1. 7
-3.4
-4.5
-0.3
1.7

-1.96
-5.3
2.1
-1.4
-2.2
0.7
2.1

Scenario (a). 'I/;: starting from the 1991 value for nominal GDP growth, if 'I/J
exceeds 5%, it declines at a constant exponential rate and reaches 5% by the
end of 1996. It stays constant at its 1991 value otherwise.
The value of the constant deficit-GDP ratio that would bring the debt-GDP
ratio to 60% by the end of 1996 is calculated.
Scenario (b). Same as (a) but taking 1998 rather than 1996 as the target date.
Scenario ( c). ¢: if 'I/J exceeds 5% in 1991, the 5% is reached immediately in 1992
and maintained thereafter. It stays constant at its 1991 value otherwise.
The value of the constant deficit-GDP ratio that would bring the debt-GDP
ratio to 60% by the end of 1996 is calculated.
Scenario (d). Same as (c) but taking 1998 rather than 1996 as the target date.
TABLE II.9
lffl!T CONSTANT PRIIARY DEFICIT~DP RATIO TO GET TO THE DEBT TARGET?

debt 91

It
B
DK

GR
IR
NL
p

¢91

(%)

(%)

101.2
129.4
66.7
96.4
102.8
78.4
64.7

8.8
4.7
4.0
21.3
5.1
5.4
16.1

primary
deficit-GDP
ratio

The constant primary deficit-GDP ratio that
would reduce the debt-GDP ratio to 60% under
scenarios:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

o.o

-11.7
-17.8
-2.8
-11.5
-11.3
-5.8
-2.8

-9.6
-13.9
-2.4
-10.1
-8.8
-4.7
-,2.4

-11.0
-17.6
-2.9
-9.9
-11.4
-5.7
-2.9

-8.6
-13.6
-2.6
-7.8
-8.9
-4.6
-2.6

-4.7
-5.4
3.3

-6.0
-2.0
-2.1

Scenarios: same as in Table II.8. We further assume a constant 5% real
interest rate and a constant 3% growth rate of real GDP.
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TABLE II.10
lffi!T CONSTANT DEFICIT-GDP RA.TIO TO GET lliFVA.Y TO THE DEBT TA.IGET ?

debt 91

It
B
DK

GR
IR
NL

p

¢91

def91

debt *

The constant deficit-GDP ratio that
reduces the debt-GDP ratio
halfway to 60% u_nder scenarios:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(%)

(%)

(%)

0.3
-1.5
2.4
0.6
0.2
1.7
2.6

1.4
0.5
2.6
1.6
1.4
2.2
2.7

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

101.2
129.4
66.7
96.4
102.8
78.4
64.7

8.8
4.7
4.0
21.3
5.1
5.4
16.1

10.2
6.2
2.0
16.5
2.3
3.9
6.4

80.6
94.7
63.4
78.2
81.4
69.2
62.4

1.4
-1.6
2.2
3.9
0.2
1.8
4.3

2.6
0.3
2.4
5.0
1.4
2.3
4.5

Scenarios: same as in Table Il.8. However, the target debt-GDP ratio is now
halfway between the 1991 value and 60%. debt * denotes this new target.
TABLE II.11
lffi!T CONSTANT PRIDRY DEFICIT-GDP RA.TIO TO GET lliFVA.Y TO THE DEBT TA.IGET?

debt 91

It
B
DK

GR
IR
NL
p

¢91

primary
deficit
1991

debt *

The constant primary deficit-GDP ra
that reduces the debt-GDP ratio
halfway to 60% under scenarios:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

101.2
129.4
66.7
96.4
102.8
78.4
64.7

8.8

0.0
-4.7
-5.4
3.3
-6.0
-2.0
-2.1

80.6
94.7
63.4
78.2
81.4
69.2
62.4

-7 .1
-10.2
-2.8
-7.4
-6.6
-3.7
-2.4

-6.1
--8 .2
-2.4
-6.9
-5.3
-3.2
-2.4

-6.5
-9.9
-2.9
-5.9
-6.7
-3.6
-1.9

-5.2
-7.9
-2.6
-4.8
-5.4
-3.1
-1.8

4.7
4.0
21.3
5.1
5.4
16.1

Scenarios: same as in Table Il.10. The real interest rate is constant at 5%
and the growth rate of real GDP is constant at 3%.
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Table III.1.
EC General Government Gross and Net Debt, in 1990.

Germany
France
Italy

U.K.

Belgium
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
Spain
Portugal
Luxembourg
*Vest

Gross Debt
(% GDP)
(EC)
(OECD)

Net Debt
(% GDP)
(OECD)

43.6 * 43.9
46.6
47.1
98.6 103.8
42.8
36.7
127.3 131.5
66.4
59.6
93.7
85.2
103.0 113.0
78.3
79.8
44.5
45.3
68.2
NA
7.3
NA

24.1
25.4
100.9
30.0
121.3
27.3
NA

NA
59.3
32.7
NA
NA

Germany.
** On a SNA basis except for the UK and Greece where the data are based on
national methods.
Sources: EC and OECD Economic Outlook.
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of
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apply with unusual force.
1 A number of other papers have recently analyzed and discussed the
case for tight
fiscal rules in the context of EMU and presented arguments partly similar to those
in our paper. Among the recent important contributions are those by Bean [1992],
Begg et. al. [1991], Eichengreen (1992] and Kenen [1992).
2 "Uncoordinated and divergen
t nationa l budgetary policies would undermine
monetary stabilit y and generate imbalances in the real and financia l sectors
of the Community" (Delors Report (1989), page 16).
3 For an detailed overview
of this debate, see Voolley [1991]. Recent
contribu tions to the fiscal implications of Maastricht include Buiter [1992],
Corsett i and Roubini [1992a] and Eichengreen [1992].
4 It does not, however, proscrib e the "indirec t" purchase of government
securiti es in the secondary market by the future ECSB. Open market
operatio ns, foreign exchange market interven tion and indeed domestic credit
expansion that ends up financing government deficits , remain possible , as long
as any sales or purchases of government debt by the ECSB go through the
secondary market rather than straight between the government and the ECSB, and
as long as they occur at the initiati ve of the independent ECSB. There
is no
substan tive distinct ion between the government selling its debt to the private
sector and the central bank subsequently buying that debt from the private
sector and the government selling debt to the central bank directly .
5 After the monetary union,
if the Council decides that an excessive deficit
exists, it will make fiscal recommendations to the member state (not to be
made public at first), establis hing a deadline by which to take the necessary
correcti ve steps. If by this time-lim it no effectiv e action is undertaken,
the recommendations are made public (presumably as a way to embarrass the
deviant country) and the member state is required to submit periodic reports
about its adjustment efforts. Finally, if the fiscal imbalance persists , the
Council may decide: a) to require the member state to publish addition al
information before issuing debt; b) to invite the European investment bank to
reconsid er its lending policy towards that state; c) to require the member
state to make a non-int erest bearing deposit with the Community or d) to
impose a fine of "an appropriate size". While the threat of not being allowed to
join the monetary union because of failing to meet the fiscal criterion would be a
strong sanction against a country interested in joining EMU, the range of sanctions
considered for deviant countries after EMU is achieved appears to be quite mild.
6 These criteria are presente d
in Article 109j and explained in detail in
Protocol on the Convergence Criteria . Article 1 of this Protocol states the
that
the price stabilit y criterio n "shall mean that a Member State has a price
performance that is sustaina ble and an average inflatio n rate, observed over
period of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more than a
1.5 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member
States in terms of price stabilit y". According to Article 4, "The criterio n
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on the convergence of interes t rates ... shall mean that, observed over a period
of one year before the examination, a Member State has an average nomina
long-term interes t rate that does not exceed by more than two percentage l
points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of
·price stabili ty". Article 3 require s a Member State to respec t "the
fluctua tions margins ... of the European Monetary System without severenormal
s
for at least the last two years before the examination. In particu lar, tension
the
Member State· shall not have devalued its curren cy's bilate ral centra l rate
agains t any other Member State's currency on its ow initiat ive for the same
period ".
7 See for example the chapte r on the implica tions for public
finance
the Commission of the European Communities (1991) document on EMU. of EMU in
8 For example,
the Commission document on the "Economics of EMU"
ission of
the European Communities (1991)) discussed sustain ability of debt (Comm
under
the
assumption that the long term growth rate is going to be 3.0% for all member
states except those whose GDP per capita is more than 25% below average for
which growth is foreca st to be 3.5% (these are Greece, Spain, Ireland
and
Portug al).
9 German inflati on (as measured by the GDP deflato r)
averaged 4.5%
the
1974-83 period , 2.4% in the 1984-1989 period and accele rated to 3.4%in and
4.3%
in 1990 and 1991.
10 See for example the Commission background study
on monetary union and the
1991 Annual Report in Commission of the European Communities [1991, 1992].
11 The share of the
general government fixed capita l formation in GDP was equal
to 3.00% in 1990 and 1991 and averaged 3.027. in the 1974-1989 period
.
12 The failure of the Community to consider such a inflati on
correc tion leads to
gross mistakes in officia l EC documents measuring whether the EC countr
satisfy the "golden rule". For example, the study on budgetary policie siesin
the Community attache d to the 1991 Annual Report of the Commission measure
gross saving as the differe nce between nominal net lending (as a% of GDP) s and
public investment (as a% of GDP). Then, high debt and/or high inflati on
countr ies suchs as Italy, Greece, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal appear as
having large (and sometimes huge) dissavings and a failure to satisfy the
"golden rule" while a correc t measure of savings would show in severa l cases
positiv e savings.
13 Since high debt countr ies such as Belgium, Ireland , Greece
and Italy
only gradua lly reduce their debt to the 60% level, a defici t target set will
in
terms of nominal defici t, implies that a very small fractio n of their public
investment would be financed through borrowing even in the best scenari o in
which their inflati on rate has been reduced to the 2% target . Real governm
ent
savings will be persis tently positiv e.
14 It should be observed that the high deficit figures in
the 1970s were
inflate d by the high nominal rates of interes t associa ted with the high
inflati on rates of the post 1973 period , while the Maastricht referen ce values
of 3% appear to be looking forward to a future of balanced growth with
low
inflati on.
Formally, with an N-period real interes t rate rN , an N-period growth rate of
real GDP gN ,and a debt-GDP ratio dt-l at the end of period t-1, the required
15
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* is given
N-period primary surplus-G DP ratio sN
by:
*
sN

=

(rN - gN)
[1+gN]N
[l+gNT] [l - i+rN ] dt-1
(l+gN) [1 - i+rN ]

Vhen N = 1, this simplifie s to
* [rl - gl]
sl = 1 + g dt-1
1
Ve also define the actual N-period primary surplus-G DP ratio, s~, to be that
constant primary surplus-GDP ratio whose present discounte d value over N
periods is the same as the present discounte d value of the actually planned or
expected primary surplus-GDP ratio over the next N periods. The actual primary
surplus-GDP ratio is denoted s.
a

SN

-

(rN-gN )
~[l+gN] k
l+gN]N ~ i+rN st-l+k
(l+gN)[l - [~ ] k=l

The N-period primary gap in period t, GAP~ is defined as the excess of
the required N-period primary surplus-GDP ratio, s:, over the actual N-period
primary surplus-GDP ratio, s~
N
*
a
GAPt = SN - SN
The N-period myopic primary gap in period t, MGAP~ is defined as the excess
* over
of the required N-period primary surplus-GDP ratio, sN,
the actual
primary surplus-GDP ratio in period t, st :
~..-,-, A nN __ *
1v1u.fl.r t = sN - st
Vhen N = 1, the primary gap calculatio ns simplify to:
1
1 _ *
1 - g1]
(20)
GAPt = MGAPt = s 1 - s 1 = 1 + gl dt-l - st
When N -+ CD, the permanent primary gap and the myopic permanent primary gap are
given by

a [r

and

g]

r CD - CD
CD_
MGAP t = [ 1 + g dt-l - st
CD

16

It should be observed that the significa nt deteriora tion of the Italian
fiscal condition s in early 1992 makes the forecast of a 0.7 surplus as
completel y unrealist ic. Even if the fiscal correctio n that is now being
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considered is implemented, the best outcome for 1992 would not
more than a
zero primary balance. In this case the permanent primary gap forbe 1992
would be
1.9% of GDP rather than 1.2%.
11 Note that the effective interest rate on the debt of
the consolidated general
government and central bank will be below that of the general government alone,
because of the zero interest rate bearing liabilities of the central bank (the monetary
base).
1s If the 1991 growth rate of nominal GDP is less
than 5%, we assumed
the
1991 value is maintained for each subsequent period; simila rly, if thethat
1991
deficit-GDP ratio is below 3%, we assume that the 1991 value is maintained for
each subsequent period . Ve therefo re allow for deficit and
on
overac hievers . Ve repeated the simulation for the case where inflati
there are no
overachievers (i.e. all countr ies will move to 3% deficit s and
nominal GDP
growth by 1996 or 1998) but the results for what happens to the 5%debt-GD
P
values were not very differe nt.
19 In high inflati on countr ies, a serious dent in the
debt to GDP ratio would
result by assuming that the deficit is reduced immediately to 3% but
nominal
income growth stays at its initial 1991 high level (in most cases, howeve
the debt ratio would still be well above 60%: in the case of Italy, for r,
example, it would be 72.6% in 1998). Nonetheless, maintaining high nominal
income growth would be incons istent with the inflati on convergence criteri a;
therefo re such an option for reducing the debt ratio is not allowed
by the
Maastricht rules.
·
20 Some of the arguments in this section have appeared in recent
contributions such as
Bean [1992), Begg et. al. [1991), Eichengreen [1992) and Kenen [1992).
21 The genera l government sector include s the centra l,
state, provin cial and
local author ities as well as social securit y agencies.
22 The famili ar government budget constr aint of the macroec
onomic literat ure
considers the consolidated general government and centra l bank. Genera
l
government debt held by the centra l bank is netted out; centra l bank holding
s
of foreign exchange reserve s are treated as an asset of the consol idated
centra l bank and general government sector; base money, a centra l bank
liabili ty, becomes a (largel y non-in terest bearing monetary) liabili ty of the
consol idated centra l bank and general government sector.
23 In 1990 the ratio of monetary base to GDP ranged
from lows of 4.0, 5.4 and
5.6% for U.K., France and Denmark to highs to 17.8, 19.5, and 23.4%
for
Greece, Spain and Portug al.
24 If the market value of
the public enterp rises differs from their continu ation
value in the public sector, things would be slightl y more complicated,
as the
distrib ution between the private and public sector of the valuati on differe
would become important. Conditional on the distrib ution of the the valuati nce
change, the earlie r point stands: Gross public debt would fall if debt is on
redeemed with the proceeds of the privati zation , but there would be no furthe r
change in public sector net worth; general government fiscal defici would be
further reduced but the correc t fiscal balances of the public sectorts would
not
changed any furthe r.
2 s If there are persist
ent nation al differe nces in produc tivity growth rates in
the non-traded goods sectors , nation al inflati on differe nces can persis
t even
with a common currency.
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26 Even if the Maastri cht Treaty and protoco ls are interpre ted as ruling
out
cyclica l variatio ns in the government deficit centered on the referenc e value
of 3 percent of GDP, cyclica l variatio ns in the deficit would still be
permitted around an average value sufficie ntly below 3 percent of GDP. Any
attempt to get the average deficit sufficie ntly far below 3% of GDP to
elimina te the risk that cyclica l increase s in the deficit will take it above
the referenc e value would of course reinforc e the contrac tionary bias of the
debt and deficit norms during the transiti onal period, discussed in Section

III.2.

21 In calculat ing the social rate of return on a public
sector investment
project , one should of course allo~ for the costs associat ed with any
unavoidable distorti onary financin g of the project .
28 Note that what Italy does fiscally , and how Germany responds with
monetary
policy, really dominates the outcomes for the EC as a whole. Only Italy has
both the size and the disequil ibrium to make an EC-wide fiscal impact and
Germany of course determines monetary policy (short-t erm nominal interest
rates) for the ERM area as a whole.
2 9 See Mini st ere de L'Econom
ie et des Finances, Communique, July 29, 1992.
30 The French press release (Ministe
re de L'Economie et des Finances,
Communique, July 29, 1992) correctl y points out that some fiscal retrenchment
would occur even in the absence of the Maastricht guidelin es so that the
comparison between the Maastricht scenarios and the referenc e scenario is
affected by the choice of what the reference scenario would be.
31 See Ministe re de L'Economie
et des Finances, Communique, July 29, 1992,
Liberati on July 29, 1992 and Internat ional Herald Tribune, July 29, 1992.
3 2 See Ministe re de
L'Economie et des Finances, Communique, July 29, 1992. This
officia l French document presents the results of the IMF study for the growth
rate of the EC in the 1993-1996 period under the two scenario s (relativ e to
the referenc e scenario ). These are:

93
94
95
96
Cumulative ouput loss 92-96
Scenario I
-0.8
+0.3
+0.3
+0.3
-0.4
Scenario II
-0.9
0.0
+0.1
+0.3
-0.8
33 See Interna tional Herald Tribune, July 29, 1992.
34 Note that under Scenario
I interest rate differe ntials disappear and the
common EC level of interest rates is establis hed at the low German level.
Vith real EC output above its referenc e value by 1995 and nominal interest
rates lower than on the reference path, the demand for real money balances
must be higher and the stock of real money balances must be larger towards the
end of the simulation period under Scenario I than on the referenc e path.
Vhile this increase in real money balances may have been engineered partly by
the disinfla tion at the beginning of the simulation period, it seems likely
that it reflects in part an increase in the nominal money stock relative to
the referenc e path. Ve therefor e suspect that the smallness of the output
loss under Scenario I is due in part to the fact that, togethe r with a fiscal
contrac tion, Scenario I also has an EC-wide monetary expansion.
35 Like the IMF simulat
ions, their simulation aimed to evaluate the addition al
policy requirements needed to achieve the inflatio n and budget deficit targets
within 5 years, and the implica tions of these policies for activity , interest
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rates and exchange rates. Note also that, again as in the IMF simulatio ns,
the debt criterion has been written off as unrealist ic for the high debt EC
countries .
36 The simulatio n assumes that Germany
pursues a 2% of GDP deficit target.
Interest rates come down by about 100 basis points in Germany over the 5-year
period and the interest rates of the other member countries converge to the
German level. Here too, EC-wide monetary policy appears to be clearly
expansionary.
37 The Italian debt-GDP ratio is effective ly unchanged at about 105% at the end
of 1996 and the Belgian (about 127%), Dutch (about 77%) and Irish (about 94%)
debt-GDP ratios remain far above the Maastricht norm.
38 The 0ECD simulatio n (like the
IMF) has each national authority pursuing 2
objective s (the deficit-GDP ratio and the inflation rate) with only one "free"
instrument (fiscal policy) and another instrument (national monetary policy)
that, except for Germany, is effective ly emasculated by the requirements of
the ERM. It is therefore not surprisin g that the achievement of the deficit
targets is inconsist ent with the simultaneous achievement of the inflation
targets, which are in fact overshot for a number of countries , including
France, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and Denmark.
39 For the rest of the world, however,
they report (contrary to what the
standard 2-country Mundell model would lead one to expect) a positive activity
effect from a fiscal retrenchment in Europe. ·
40 Note that inflation convergen
ce is built into the base line, unlike the 0ECD
simulatio n.
4 1 Short real rates rise by almost 700 basis points in 1992 (relative to
base
line) and do not return to their base line level until 1996. Long real rates
(not shown in_the paper) ther~fore also incr~ase. All this occurs despi~e t~e
· fact that nominal (ten year) interest rates in Italy fall. Monetary policy in
Italy becomes contractio nary to prevent a depreciat ion of the lira vis-a-vis
the D-mark. At the end of 1996, the Italian debt-GDP ratio is effective ly
unchanged, the effect of lower deficit-GDP ratios having been canceled out by
lower nominal income growth. The paper erroneously suggests that Italy
achieves its debt to GDP target by 1992. That is shown is the ratio of debt to
baseline GDP, not to GDP under the Maastricht simulation.
42 Internati onal mutual
insurance against this form of sovereign risk cannot be
effective due to "moral hazard" problems.
43 In countries such as the United
States and Canada, independent fiscal
authoriti es at the state and regional level are allowed for follow their own
budgetary and deficit policies without that affecting or jeopardiz ing the
monetary union of the whole country. This was true even before a significa nt
degree of inter-sta te income redistrib ution and de-facto income insurance took
place through Federal transfer and tax programs (see Sachs and Sala-i-la rtin
[1992] for a study of the importance of these income sharing arrangements
through the Federal budget in the USA).
44 The proper response to sovereign
default in the EC (pre- or post-EMU) is
simple. If, for instance, the German government were to default on its
obligatio ns towards creditors resident in Germany, this would be a strictly
German problem; at the very least the defaultin g government would pay at the
next election. If German government non-performance were at the expense of
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creditors resident in other EIU countries , there should be no special
obligatio n for the non-German governments or for the supranati onal Community
agencies to compensate the losers. One would of course expect the other
national, regional or supranati onal authoriti es and the non-German private
sector to impose the usual sanctions for foreign sovereign default: no further
credit; current transactio ns on a cash-in-advance basis only; attachment of
German official assets abroad etc.
45 With the goal of creating appropriate conditions for market discipline to work, it
has been argued that regulating banks and financial intermediaries so as to limit the
amount of public debt the:y can hold in their portfolios is an effective protection from
systemic risk (Begg et al. [1991]).
4 6 Note, however, that these limits on independence also apply in spades to
today's most independent national central bank, the Bundesbank. It had at
most an advisory role in the process leading to the German government's early
support for EIU and a common currency. It was completely ignored when
Chancellor Kohl opted for accelerat ed monetary unificatio n of the two German
states and played no role in the selection of the exchange rate between the
former Vest German and East German marks.
47 The counterfa ctual to the borrowing
is current tax financing using the most
broadly-based, least distortion ary taxes. The effect on the interest rates of
other countries is most easily appreciat ed when there are credibly fixed
exchange rates or a common currency. It is also quite likely to be true,
however, if the exchange rate floats. Exchange rate risk need not be affected
appreciab ly by the choice between current taxes and borrowing.
48 Even if Bonzo's individua l
actions in the banana market cause only pecuniary
external ities, it is clear that, even when we just consider public spending on
ordinary consumer goods (such as bananas) without technolog ical external
effects, an argument can be still be made that the uncoordinated actions of
national governments will not lead to Pareto efficient outcomes. Governments
are (potentia lly) large players in the markets in which they operate, and will
not act competitively. Strategic interdependence is always present when we
deal with governments, and the equilibri a of non-cooperative games will in
general be inefficie nt. They do not lie on the contract curve. Vith
government borrowing things are different . Government debt is not an
intrinsic ally valued consumption or producer good. Variations in the amount
of public debt outstanding influence the economy only to the extent that they
redistrib ute resources between heterogeneous economic agents. Non-cooperative
government financing games are games of pure redistrib ution, that is they are
games on the contract curve. All equilibri a of these games (Nash, Stackelberg
or whatnot) are Pareto-ef ficient. The usual caveats apply about (1) dynamic
inefficiency, (2) the provision of intergenerational insurance through the .
tax-transfer-public debt mechanism in the presence of incomplete markets
participation and (3) second best complications in the presence of distortionary taxes
and transfers.
49 Given the structure of taxation
and transfer payments in most EC countries ,
borrowing involves redistrib ution from the younger (working) current
generatio ns and from future generatio ns to the current older (retired)
generatio ns. At given intertemporal relative prices (interest rates), this
boosts aggregate consumption today, at the expense of current saving and
therefore (barring Keynesian miracles) at the expense of consumption tomorrow.
It is important to realize that the government can, through its budgetary
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instruments, achieve exactly the same redis tribu tion and exactly
the same
stimulus to current consumption with a balanced budge
t
(see
e.g.
Buite
r and
Kletzer [1992b]). The government defic it and the government debt
must
be seen
in the context of the sum total of redis tribu tion mechanisms betwe
en
generations.
50 In Buite r and Kletz er f1991a,b], this argum
ent is
ped at great er lengt h,
both at a non-technical tevel (Buiter and Kletzer develo
[1991b]) and at a techn ical
level (Buiter and Kletzer [1991a]).
51 The cases of intern ation al tax competition,
natio nal subsidy races and of
the competitive dismantling of natio nal welfareofsystem
s in order to attra ct
foreign direc t investment come to mind.
5 2 A warning that German unification and
the ensuing fiscal expansion in Germany
might lead to a real appreciation of the DM was given
early on by a number of
authors; see, in particular, Begg et al. (1990].
5 3 Moreover, since the formal solvency tests
only
to the feasi bility
rathe r than the optim ality of fisca l polic y, eviderefer
nce
in
of solvency
does not neces sarily imply that the solvent count ries havefavor
follow
ed "optimal"
fisca l polic ies. In this regard, the evidence in Roubini and Sachs
1989b], Roubini [1991], Cukierman, Edwards and Tabe llini [1991] sugge[1989a,
the tax smoothing view of fisca l policy-making and the optimal seign sts that
model of the infla tion tax are both rejec ted for developed as well iorage
developing coun tries. In parti cular , trans itory shocks to output as
government spending fail to explain the movements of public debt and
in a large
set of count ries and infla tion rates do not appear to be corre lated
(or
co-in tegra ted) with tax rates .
54 See Bucha
nan, Rowley and Tollison [19861, Roubi and Sachs [1989a, 1989b],
Tabe llini [19911, Alesina and Drazen 11991], Alesini
na and Tabe llini [1990],
Tabe llini and Alesina [1990], Nordhaus [1975] Rogof
(1990] and Rogoff and
Siber t [1989}. For a more systematic survey of this f litera
ture see Corse tti
and Roubini T1992a].
Simil arly, Alesina and Roubini (1992] and Alesina, Cohen and Roubi
ni [1992,
1993) find parts isan and polit ical business cycle effec
ts
on
infla
tion
rates
for a large set of OECD count ries.
56 For a
more extended discussion of these issue s, see Corse tti and Roubini
[1992a, b].
57 This means that
the product of the stock of net govern
debt and the rate of
growth of nominal GDP is subtracted from the governmenment
t's
struct
ural current
deficit.
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Note that this makes sense only if public sector capital formation yields
a cash rate
of return to the government equal to its cost of borrowing.
In
that
case
the
criterion amounts to aiming for a zero or negative single-period primary
gap.
59 Net debt refers
to public sector debt minus public sector financial and real assets.
60 On this point
see the discussion in Garrett and Veingast [1991].
61 Veingast
and Garre tt [1991] and lilgro m, North and Veingast (1990) stres s this
important role of instit ution s as a means to enfor
ce cooperation.
62 Vhile the
natio nal centr al banks will formally
ve after EMU, they will
be no more than branch offic es of the ECB, with nosurvi
subst antiv e autonomy.
63 See Hamada and Porteus (1992] for an histori
cal perspective on monetary union and
political integration.
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